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LOOKING FOR FAIR USE IN THE
DMCA's SAFETY DANCE

Ira S. Nathenson*
We can dance ifwe want to.
We can leave yourfriends behind
'Causeyour friends don 't dance and if they don't dance,
Well, they're no friends of mine.
- Men Without Hats, "The Safety Dance"'
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INTRODUCTION

In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA").2 Prior to the DMCA, there was tremendous uncertainty
regarding copyright infringement on the internet. Copyright owners
wanted to hold accountable users of internet services as well as the
service providers themselves. But service providers - I will also call
them "intermediaries" - greatly feared copyright liability. They wanted
to offer internet services to users, but feared potentially limitless
copyright liability for materials hosted on and routed through their
networks. Arguably, they could be both directly liable by distributing3
the materials, and secondarily liable for the infringement of their users.
Even worse, courts split over the liability of intermediaries for materials
sent through their networks.4 The resulting uncertainty might have
chilled the development of internet services at a critical time in the
web's development.
These concerns led to Title II of the DMCA, which created the
"notice and take-down" procedures codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512.'
Section 512 provides intermediaries with safe harbors from monetary
copyright liability for essential internet functions such as routing, system
caching, providing search tools, and hosting user content.6 But if a
copyright owner sends a take-down notice stating that hosted user
content infringes its copyrights, the intermediary must quickly take

2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
3. Direct copyright infringement is covered by statute. See 17 U.S.C.A §§ 106, 106A, 501
(West 2009). Secondary liability, such as contributory infringement, vicarious infringement, and
the newer theory of inducement, was judicially created because "[t]he Copyright Act does not
expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another." Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984); see id. at 434-36 (discussing secondary
liability generally); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005) (crafting inducement cause of action).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title I1, §
202(a), 112 Stat. 2877 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
6. 17 U.S.C.A § 512 (West 2009).
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down the materials to preserve its safe harbor.7 This encourages
intermediaries to provide inventive internet services while still providing
owners with a mechanism to protect themselves.
Section 512 is thus a kind of "safety dance" where each partner
moves to avoid stepping on the other's toes. 9 But it only takes two to
tango, and three is a crowd. What about the third wheel in this dance,
namely, the users of internet services who host their websites, blogs, and
videos through intermediaries like Google, YouTube, and Yahoo? 0
Unfortunately for users, Section 512 fosters overreaching copyright
claims that ignore fair use."
The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse
database is filled with thousands of cease-and-desist letters, many
showing appalling copyright overreach.' 2 Even Chilling Effects founder
7. Seeid. § 512(c).
8. Malla Pollack, Rebalancing Section 512 To Protect Fair Users From Herds Of Mice Trampling Elephants, Or a Little Due Process Is Not Such a Dangerous Thing, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 547, 547 (2006) ("ISPs should have robust safe harbors against
liability for their subscribers' copyright infringement").
9. See 3 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at § 12B.07[B][C] (2009) ("Section 512
prescribes a complex minuet").
10. For this Article, I prefer the term "user" as it is more evocative of user rights, as opposed
to the term "subscriber" that is used in the statute. Indeed, even the legislative history concedes that
"subscriber" should be read broadly. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 52 n.24 (1998) ("subscribers"
includes persons with a requisite business relationship with service provider even if a formal
contract does not exist); H.R. REP.NO. 105-551(11), at 61 n.3 (1998) (same).
11. From the standpoint of the song quoted above, the singer would be the owner and the
dance partner the intermediary. Since it takes two to tango, the users - the shunned "friends" - are
left without any dance partner. Another verse illustrates even better the irony of Section 512 as a
"Safety Dance":
Say, we can act if we want to.
If we don't nobody will.
And you can act real rude, and totally remove,
And I can act like an imbecile.
The Safety Dance,supra note 1. Section 512 has received significant and deserved criticism. See
Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1087, 1113 (2007) ("legal uncertainty
surrounding fair use, coupled with the Copyright Act's so-called notice-and-takedown regime, led
to a retreat from reliance on fair use in a number of cases"); Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights.:
Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789, 800 n.50 (2007) (finding that notifications "often
result in the cessation of the challenged conduct, even when there are legitimate issues of
noninfringement or fair use").
12. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http.//www.chillingeffects.org/ (last visited Oct. 18,
2008). Some studies have suggested that upwards of thirty percent of take-down notices on Chilling
Effects present weak claims, baseless claims, or claims with strong fair use defenses. See Jennifer
M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown Notices Under
Section 512 Of The Digital Millennium CopyrightAct, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 621, 666-67 (2006) (concluding that thirty-one percent of 512(c) and 512(d) notices raised
"significant questions related to the underlying copyright claim, including fair use defenses, other
substantive defenses, very thin copyright, or non-copyrightable subject matter"); see also MARJORIE
HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SuRvivE? 29-36 (2005), available at

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

3

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 5
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[3:121

Wendy Seltzer was targeted by highly questionable
take-downs for
13
YouTube.
to
posted
fairly
be
to
appear
that
materials
Abusive take-downs also affected the 2008 general election
campaign. Senator John McCain complained to YouTube that some of
his political advertisements were wrongly taken down in response to
take-down notices. 14 He requested that YouTube refrain from removing
campaign videos without individual review by YouTube legal
personnel. 5 YouTube declined, noting that it risked losing its safe
16
harbor if it failed to remove content in response to a take-down notice.
YouTube nevertheless suggested that it looked forward to working with
McCain to strengthen the fair use doctrine "so that intermediaries like us
can rely ' on
this important doctrine with a measure of business
7
certainty.'

http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf (earlier study of cease-and-desist
letters from 2004); Sonia Katval (moderator), FairUse: Its Application, Limitations and Future, 17
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017, 1028 (2007) (comments of Professor Laura
Quilter) (discussing problems with Section 512) [hereinafter "Quilter Comments"].
It is
questionable how much weight can be given studies based on the Chilling Effects database. As
Urban and Quilter admit, the data set consists of two main groups: a Google set that is skewed
towards search engine issues, and a "self-reported" data set that is relatively small; moreover,
"individuals who have a strong defense (or at least believe there is a strong defense) are more likely
to submit their notices" to Chilling Effects. Urban & Quilter, supra note 12, at 642. It is therefore
conceivable that even though studies reflect high percentages of abusive notifications, it is possible
that the overall percentage of problematic notifications is smaller.
13. The NFL sent notices demanding removal of a video containing the overblown copyright
claims the NFL puts in football broadcasts.
See Posting of Super Bowl Highlights to
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a4uC2HIOulo (Feb. 8, 2007); Posting of NFL: Second Down
and
Goal?
to
WENDY'S
BLOG:
LEGAL
TAGS,
http://wendy.seltzer.org/bloglarchives/2007/04/05/nflseconddownandgoal.html (Apr. 5, 2007).
Further
posts
by
Wendy
Seltzer
about
the
dispute
can
be
found
at
http://wendy.seltzer.org/blog/dmca-nfi (last visited Oct. 25, 2008); see also infra text accompanying
notes 162-168.
14. Letter from Trevor Potter, General Counsel McCain/Palin, to Chad Hurley, CEO,
YouTube, LLC, et al. (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/mccain_
youtubecopyrightletter l0.13.08-3.pdf [hereinafter "Letter from McCain"]; see also Sarah Lai
Stirland, Stifled by Copyright, McCain Asks YouTube to Consider Fair Use, WIRED BLOG
NETWORK: THREAT LEVEL, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/10/stifled-by-copy.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2008).
15. Letter from McCain, supranote 14.
16. Sarah Lai Stirland, YouTube to McCain: You Made Your DMCA Bed, Lie in It, WIRED
BLOG NETWORK: THREAT LEVEL, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/10/youtube-to-mcca.html
(reprinting Letter from Zahavah Levine, Chief Counsel, YouTube, to Trevor Potter, General
Counsel McCain/Palin (Oct. 15, 2008)) [hereinafter "Letter to McCain"]. YouTube noted that "[n]o
number of lawyers could possibly determine with a reasonable level of certainty whether all of the
videos for which we receive disputed takedown notices qualify as fair use." Letter to McCain,
supra note 16, at 2.
17. Letter to McCain, supranote 16, at 3.
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Regardless of what happened in these particular examples, all too
often take-downs are sent without sufficient thought being given to fair
or other non-infringing uses. Although there may be some justification
to treating fair use as an affirmative defense in actual litigation, the takedown process is equivalent to a de facto ex parte seizure. 8 This creates
tremendous incentives for lawyers to send questionable take-downs in
the hopes that the affected users will back down after their materials are
removed. Although Section 512(f) contains a provision permitting
damages and attorney fees for knowing material misrepresentations in
connection with a take-down, 9 this provision has been rarely construed
by the courts.2 °
Is there anything that users like Seltzer and McCain can do to seek
put-back of their materials? At first glance, users would seem to have an
easy remedy because Section 512(g) permits users to send counternotifications. 21 After materials are removed, a user can send a counternotice to the intermediary, which must restore the material unless the
owner files suit.22 Although Seltzer sent counter-notices, in reality, few
users ever send counter-notices. 23 Why? One answer may be that many
DMCA notices seek removal of genuinely infringing materials, and a
counter-notice would be meritless.2 4
But the dearth of counter-notices may also be because the counternotification procedures are so unclear that they chill users from asserting
Section 512(g)(3) states that materials can be restored
their rights.
only if the user has "a good faith belief that the material was removed or
disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of the material to be
removed or disabled. 26 Does "mistake" mean just an error of fact (such
as an owner incorrectly citing the materials to be removed or an

18. See infra Part 11I.B
19. 17 U.S.C.A § 512(0 (West 2009).
20. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
21. 17 U.S.C.A § 512(g) (West 2009).
22. Id.
23. As one study notes, Chilling Effects contains few counter-notices, which intermediaries
confidentially suggest are rare. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 12, at 679.
24. In such a case, the user may count its lucky stars if the worst thing that happens is that the
materials are removed without suit. Where applicable, statutory damages per work can go up to
$150,000, not counting possible attorney's fees. See 17 U.S.C.A §§ 504-505 (West 2009).
25.

Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J.L. &

ARTS 397, 415 (2007) (noting that unclear counter-notification process makes it easy to chill
transformative uses, "rais[ing] serious questions about the effects on speech that are not fully
known"). It is worth noting that Professor Kasunic is also Principal Legal Advisor at the Office of
the General Counsel at the U.S. Copyright Office. Id at 397 n. *.
26. 17 U.S.C.A § 512(g)(3)(C) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
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intermediary's removal of the wrong materials), or does it also include
an error of law (such as claiming infringement when the conduct is fair
use)? Unfortunately, Section 512 does not expressly answer this
question and is silent on whether fair or other non-infringing uses are
bases for put-back.
Even more troublingly, the allegation of mistake must be made on
penalty of perjury, further chilling users from sending them.2 7 Although
a user might file suit for a declaration of non-infringement, most people
lack the resources or backbone for litigation, causing potentially lawful
speech to be removed from the internet without any judicial scrutiny.
That would permit owners to obtain relief that they could never get in
court. Such a scenario is appalling, especially considering that the putback provisions were added at the prompting of then-Senator John
Ashcroft, who strongly
felt that a fair user should not have to go to court
28
herself.
to protect
Today, it is encouraging to hear another Senator - now, Senator
McCain - speak up for fair use, but it is also worth noting that McCain
voted for the Senate version of the DMCA. 29 Regardless, McCain's
request to YouTube contains an intriguing premise: implicit in it is the
assumption that fair use can be protected under Section 512 as it exists
without amendment.30 In this Article, I test McCain's assumption,
asking whether we can interpret Section 512 to better foster fair use. I
believe that we can. In this Article, I argue that copyright owners must
consider fair or other non-infringing uses before sending take-down
notices, and that users should be able to send counter-notices on the
basis of fair or non-infringing use. Although neither conclusion is
obvious from the face of the statute, both are strongly supported by
examinations of legislative history as well as of the statute itself,
particularly in light of the fact that DMCA take-downs essentially permit

27. Id.

28. 144 CONG. REC. S4884-01, S4889 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
29. See U.S. Senate
Roll Call Votes,
105th Congress - 2nd
Session,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/roll-call-vote-cfin.cfin?congress=105&sessio
n=2&vote=00137. In fairness, all voting on the bill voted in favor of it. Id.
30. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that Section 512 will be amended in the short term and
that we are stuck with it, warts and all. Regarding proposals to amend Section 512 to expressly
address fair use, see generally Pollack, supra note 8. 1 agree that Section 512 could be vastly
improved by changes - for example, Professor Pollack proposes that materials not be initially
removed until at least ten days have passed from the time the take-down notice is received. Id at
574. This would give users parallel rights to those of owners (who get ten to fourteen days before
material is restored after a counter-notice is sent), and would reduce the harm that is created when
speech is improperly removed.
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exparte seizures of speech that might never be permitted in civil actions.
In the spirit of the forum for which this Article was prepared, and with
the aim of keeping length reasonable, the Article assumes a basic
knowledge of copyright law, particularly regarding the distinctions
between direct and secondary liability as well as fundamentals of fair
use.
Part I recounts the concerns that prompted the drafting of Section
512. It also discusses Senator Ashcroft's addition of counter-notification
procedures. Although those procedures are not as clear as they could be,
the legislative history leaves no doubt that Ashcroft felt strongly that fair
users need not go to court to have removed materials put back.
Part II addresses intermediaries. After noting how the notice and
take-down process has been pervasive and led to a broad remix culture,
Part II turns to Senator McCain's suggestion that intermediaries like
YouTube consider fair use before removing political videos.
Unfortunately, Section 512's safe harbors give intermediaries little
incentive to accept McCain's suggestion. Instead, the statute as it exists
encourages intermediaries to operate with blinders, ignoring user content
until a take-down notice is received. Moreover, failing to remove
materials after a take-down is received might expose intermediaries to
potentially significant liability.
Instead, I argue that fair use might be better protected through
proper construction of the take-down, counter-notice, and
misrepresentation provisions. With that in mind, Part III addresses
copyright owners, for which a recent case provides support. In Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp.,3I the court held that owners who deliberately
ignore fair use before sending take-downs could be liable for knowing
material misrepresentations under Section 512(f).32 Lenz reached the
right result. In the ex parte context of take-downs (where works are
taken down without prior involvement of the user), fair use must be
considered by the owner. Plus, failure to consider fair use may be
willful blindness by the owner. By requiring owners to stop-and-think,
the Lenz case may deter frivolous take-downs.
In Part IV, I turn to how Section 512 should be interpreted
regarding users. Because a stop-and-think rule for take-downs will not
cure all problems with abusive take-down notices, users need a safety

31. 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
32. Id at 1154-56 (noting that copyright owner must consider fair use before sending takedown notice or risk suit by user under 17 U.S.C. § 512(0); see infra notes 93-103 and
accompanying text (discussing Lenz case).
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valve. Moreover, fair use is highly indeterminate, and in many cases a
lawyer who considers fair use might reasonably conclude that the law is
sufficiently unclear that a take-down can be sent in good faith. In both
cases, the materials will still be taken down. Therefore, users must be
permitted to send counter-notices based on fair or other non-infringing
uses. In other words, "mistake or misidentification" must include not
just errors of fact, but also arguable errors of law. This conclusion is
preferable to forcing fair users to go to the expense and delay of
litigation to obtain restoration of fairly used materials. Any concerns
about a flood of frivolous counter-notices may be amply countered by
the fact that users who send frivolous put-backs expose themselves to
potentially significant copyright liability, as well as potential liability for
making misrepresentations in connection with a counter-notice.
Regarding more arguable cases of fair use, the burden of filing suit
should be on owners who seek to limit speech.
I. A NEW DANCE SENSATION
In drafting Section 512, Congress recognized that the internet is a
hotbed of copyright infringement. 3 Through its non-judicial process for
quick removal of claimed infringement, Section 512 tremendously
reduced the costs of copyright enforcement.
It also spurred the
development of a wide variety of online services by intermediaries that
otherwise might not have been created.34 Indeed, on the DMCA's 10th
anniversary, even Wired Magazine recognized that "[t]oday's internet is
largely an outgrowth of the much-reviled" DMCA. 35 In this Part, I

33. As Professor John Tehranian argues, there is a "vast disparity between copyright law and
copyright norms." John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 539 (2007). Using a fictional Professor named "John," he suggests
that a normal day of activity could lead to potential copyright liability of over $12 million. Id. at
543-48; see also Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617 (2008) (noting that opt-in
emerging as system to deal with patterns of mass but tolerated infringement).
34. Examples abound, such as YouTube, Cafepress, Facebook, MySpace, etc. Of course,
some of these have led to highly contested litigation. The Google Book Search litigation ended in a
$125 million settlement that permitted Google to profit from books it scanned. See Miguel HeIft &
Motoko Rich, Google Settles Suit over Book-Scanning, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008,
http'//www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/technology/internet/29google.html.
Litigation against
YouTube and Googe for infringing videos is pending. See Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc., 1:2007cv02103 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 13, 2007), unofficial docket available at
http://news.justia.com/cases/featured/new-york/nysdce/! :2007cv02103/302164/.
35. "If you're wondering whom to thank for the Web 2.0 explosion in interactive websites,
consider sending a bouquet to Congress." David Kravets, 10 Years Later, MisunderstoodDMCA is
the Law That Saved the Web, WIRED.COM THREAT LEVEL, Oct. 27, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/
27bstroke6/2008/10/ten-years-later.html.
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review the technological and legal history that led to the drafting of
Section 512, consider the statute that resulted, and outline the statutory
problems specific to fair use concerns.
A.

Uncertainty regardingintermediaries

Ten years ago, the copyright liability of intermediaries was
uncertain.
Emerging case law left it unclear whether internet
intermediaries would be liable for copyright infringement of others. On
the one hand, in Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Frena,36 the court held that
the operator of a bulletin board ("BBS") was directly liable for copyright
infringement by unknowingly distributing and displaying images that
had been uploaded to the BBS by a user.37 The outcome implied that
intermediaries might be liable for providing backbone internet services
such as routing, making temporary cache copies, or providing hosting
services. Such an outcome could chill the market for developing internet
services.
A contrary result was reached in Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Services,3 9 where Netcom, an internet
service provider ("ISP"), was sued for infringing works that were posted
online by a BBS user and distributed to others via Netcom. 4° The court
reached a very different
result, holding that Netcom was not liable for
41
direct infringement:

36. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
37. Id. at 1554, 1556-57. Although the BBS operator complained that he didn't know of the
infringement and promptly removed the materials upon receiving notice, the court noted that direct
copyright liability does not require knowledge. Id at 1554, 1559.
38. "Without these issues being clearly delineated we would have faced a future of
uncertainty regarding the growth of Internet .... " 144 CONG. REc. S4884-01, S4889 (May 14,
1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
39. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
40. Id. at 1365. Plaintiffs, who owned copyrights to works written by Scientology founder L.
Ron Hubbard, filed suit over works posted to a BBS by a critic who was once a church minister. Id.
Plaintiffs sued the critic, the BBS operator, and Netcom, which provided the BBS with internet
service. Id. at 1365-66. The Usenet is a "worldwide community of electronic BBSs" containing
messages "organized into thousands of topical groups, or 'Newsgroups."' Id at 1365 n.4 (some
internal quotes omitted).
41. Id. at 1370-71; see also Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F.
Supp. 1167, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that a web host "may not be held liable for direct
infringement"). Strangely, the Netcom court distinguished Frena on the basis that the earlier case
concerned the rights ofpublic distributionandpublic display. 907 F. Supp. at 1370-71. In contrast,
said the Netcom court, the suit at hand was for infringement of the right of reproduction. Id. at
1371. This distinction is odd, considering that the rationale of Frena - that one may directly
infringe without knowledge or intent - would appear to apply as strongly to reproduction as it does
to public distribution and display.
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Netcom's actions, to the extent that they created a copy of
plaintiffs' works, were necessary to having a working system
for transmitting Usenet postings to and from the Internet....
Netcom's act of designing or implementing a system that
automatically and uniformly creates temporary copies of all
data sent through it is not unlike that of the owner 42
of a
copying machine who lets the public make copies with it.

Although the court's "copying machine" analogy is debatable, 43 the
result was good as a policy matter. Liability against Netcom "would
also result in liability for every single" linked server, even though such
intermediaries "do no more than operate or implement a system that is
essential if ...messages are to be widely distributed. '44 Nevertheless,
the court left the door open for liability in appropriate circumstances
46
45
implicating contributory infringement or possibly vicarious liability.
Cases like Frena and Netcom left unclear the potential liability of
ISPs. Should they be subject to the traditional strict liability? Should
statutory immunity provisions be enacted? 7 Or should Congress leave

42. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368-69.
43. The analogy suggests that it is the public who is using the "copy machine," but in for
internet services, both the user and the owner of the "copy machine" participate in the transmission
of files online. If an ISP is like a copy machine, it is arguably like one at a Kinko's store where a
Kinko's employee makes copies at a customer's request without looking at the copies.
44. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369-70.
45. Contributory infringement exists where the defendant, "'with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another."' Id.at 1373
(quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971)). The court concluded that the plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of material fact for
contributory infringement as to postings made after Netcom was on notice of claimed infringement.
Id at 1375.
46. Vicarious liability exists where the defendant "(1) has the right and ability to control the
[direct] infringer's acts and (2) receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement." Id. at
1375. Summary judgment was appropriate for Netcom because its fixed service fee was not a
"direct financial benefit." Id. at 1377. However, nothing in Netcom appears to foreclose vicarious
liability against intermediaries in other circumstances, such as where there is a direct tie between
service fees and infringement.
47. Only two years earlier, interactive computer services (such as ISPs) were granted
immunity from defamation and certain other claims. See Communications Decency Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No 104-104, Title L § 509, 110 Stat. 137-38 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
230); see also, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Section 230 "immunizes computer service providers like AOL from liability for information that
originates with third parties"). Like the DMCA, CDA section 230 overruled earlier caselaw that
found intermediaries liable for the wrongs of others. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 194. As Professor Laura Heymann noted at the IP
forum, Section 512 has one advantage over the CDA: a user can seek reinstatement of material
under the DMCA, but a user has no right of reinstatement for material removed under the CDA.
Compare 17 U.S.C.A § 512(g) (West 2009) (put-back process), with 47 U.S.C.A § 230(cX2) (West

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/5

10

Nathenson: Looking for Fair Use in the DMCA's Safety Dance
2009]

LOOKING FOR FAIR USE IN THE DMCA's SAFETY DANCE

development of the law to courts? Commissioner Bruce Lehman's
"White Paper" 4 8 took the latter approach, suggesting that it would be
"premature to reduce" service provider liability, and arguing:
It would be unfair - and set a dangerous precedent - to allow

one class of distributors to self-determine their liability by
refusing to take responsibility. This would encourage
intentional and willful ignorance. Whether or not they choose
to control activities on their systems, they
to reserve the right
49
have that right.

Lehman's approach was not followed, and a legislative solution
was crafted. As noted below, the DMCA solves the problem of
intermediaries by crafting a solution that in fact relies in part on the
legislatively sanctioned willful blindness of the intermediary.5 °
B.

A statutory "solution"

Despite Lehman's concerns, Congress faced heavy pressure from
intermediaries wanting immunity and copyright owners who wanted
After tense
easy enforcement of copyrights on the internet.5 1
negotiations between these constituencies and Congress, Section 512
was included as Title II of the DMCA. 52 Section 512 rejects the holding
of Frena in favor of a modified version of the framework enunciated in
Netcom. 53 Thus, it provides qualified safe harbors for internet backbone

2009) (no comparable provision).
48. Bruce Lehman & Ronald Brown, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF

(Sept.
1995),
RIGHTS
PROPERTY
ON
INTELLECTUAL
GROUP
WORKING
THE
http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf [hereinafter "White Paper"]. The White Paper was
published prior to the Netcom decision, although the authors were aware of the pending litigation.
See id. at 121-22 & n. 391 (noting filing of the complaint).
49. Id.at 122.
50. Ironically, although Section 512 encourages intermediaries to be willfully blind, I suggest
in infra Part I.C and IV.B that willful blindness is highly relevant to whether an owner or user has
made a misrepresentation that causes liability under Section 512(0.
51. Orrin G. Hatch, Toward a PrincipledApproach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn of
the Millennium, 59 U. Prrr. L. REv. 719, 749 (1998) (noting "service providers argued that they
needed more certainty in order to attract the huge investments necessary to achieve the potential of
the Internet").
52. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title 11,§
202(a), 112 Stat. 2877 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551(1), at 11 (1998) (stating that the bill "essentially codifies the
result" in Netcom, "overrules" Frena, and "[a]s to direct infringement, liability is ruled out for
passive, automatic acts engaged in through a technological process initiated by another"); see also
ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting House
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services, including
routing, system caching, hosting services, and
54
location tools.
Of primary interest here is Section 512(c), which provides a safe
harbor for providing hosting services for others, such as hosting users'
websites, blogs, photos, and videos. Broadly speaking, a "service
provider" is not monetarily liable for copyright infringement if: 1) it
lacks the knowledge requisite for contributory infringement;" 2) it is not
vicariously liable;5 6 or 3) upon receiving proper notice from a copyright
owner, it acts "expeditiously" to remove or disable access to the
allegedly infringing material.57 The third condition is the basis for the
"notice and take-down" regime of the DMCA. If a copyright owner
provides proper notification, the service provider must act quickly to
remove or disable the disputed content or risk losing the protections of
the safe harbor.5"
Proper notification should include, inter alia,
"[i]dentification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity" and a "statement that the complaining
party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law. ,59

Report and noting that statute codified Netcom). Although an earlier version of H.R. 2281 stated
that the safe harbor would be against only direct liability, the enacted statute provides safe harbor
against all kinds of copyright infringement liability. See CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373
F.3d 544, 554 & n.* (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing H.R. REP. No. 105-551(I), at 7-8).
54. 17 U.S.C.A § 512(a)-(d) (West 2009).
55. Id § 512(c)(l)(A). There is no mention of activities such as giving material contribution
to the infringement of others, because one who provides hosting services is, by definition, materially
contributing to direct infringement. If a service provider becomes aware of "facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent," they must act "expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material" to retain the safe harbor. Id. § 512(c)(l)(A)(ii), (iii).
56. Id.§ 512(c)(1)(B).
57. Id.§ 512(c)(1)(C). As Professor Jane Ginsburg points out, "the threshold requirements
for immunity closely track the traditional elements of secondary liability." Jane C. Ginsburg,
Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of
Copyright-DependentTechnology Entrepreneurs,50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 591 (2008).
58. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(C) (West 2009); see also id.§ 512(c)(3) (listing contents of
proper notification).
59. Id.§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), (v). Section 512(d) contains a similar notice and take-down regime
for online location tools such as search engines that link to infringing materials. Id § 512(d). The
discussion of take-downs in this Article generally focuses on Section 512(c) and 512(f).
Nonetheless, this Article's analysis is generally applicable to search engine take-downs as well, as
the requirements for take-downs in Section 512(d) are generally the same as those in Section 512(c).
See id.§ 512(dX3).
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C. A discordantnote, and SenatorAshcroft's amendment
Unfortunately, during the statute's drafting, user rights were treated
as an afterthought. Nothing in Section 512 mentions fair use.6 ° Instead,
the Senate Judiciary Committee mostly focused on obtaining agreement
between copyright owners and intermediaries.
This creates three
problems. First, the statute does not expressly indicate that owners must
consider fair or other non-infringing uses before sending takedowns.
Because Section 512 permits a copyright owner to obtain quick removal
of materials without filing suit, the potential for abuse is strong. Second,
if a baseless take-down notice is sent, it is not clear when a lawyer (or its
client) will be civilly liable for frivolous take-downs. Section 512(f)
provides a civil action for damages and attorney's fees arising from
notifications based on a knowing material misrepresentation. 62 But the
scope of that action is unclear. What if a notice asserts a prima facie
case of infringement but the sender is willfully blind to strong signs of
fair use? Third, the scope of a user's right to attain quick restoration of
fairly used materials is not clear.
Fortunately, procedures permitting notice and put-back were added,
primarily at the behest of then-Senator John Ashcroft, who was
concerned that the agreement between intermediaries and copyright
owners "provided little or no protection for an Internet user wrongfully
accused of violating the copyright laws. 6 3 With the support of Senators
Hatch and Leahy, the "Ashcroft-Leahy-Hatch amendment" was added to
the Senate version of S. 2037.64 Although the Senate and House put
forth competing versions of the DMCA, Ashcroft's amendments

60. See Pollack, supranote 8, at 574 (noting that Section 512 "assumes that the subscriber is a
rodent and makes no provision for fair use").
61.

144 CONG. REC. S4884-01, S4885 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (finding that

Section 512 "reflects 3 months of negotiations between the major copyright owners and the major
[service providers], which I encouraged and in which I participated, and which took place with the
assistance of Senator Ashcroft").
62. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(f) (West 2009). It also covers misrepresentations in counter-notices.
Id.
63. 144 CONG. REc. S4884-01, S4889 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); see also
Urban & Quilter, supranote 12, at 635-36 (quoting Ashcroft).
64. 144 CONG. REc. S4884-01, S4886 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Ironically,

the only floor statement Senator McCain made when S. 2037 was voted on was a request that the
Senate also consider an amendment to a DOD bill, a request denied as "not the pending business."
Id. at S4884 (statements of Sens. McCain, Levin, and Presiding Officer). Before the passage of the
DMCA, Ashcrofl had introduced an earlier bill addressing the liability of online service providers.
See Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1146, 105th Cong.
(1997).
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remained without material change in the bill that was later enacted.65
Finding it "totally unacceptable" that a "user would have to go to court
to prove their innocence, 6 6 Ashcroft stated:
If material is wrongly taken down from an Internet user's
home page because the original notice mistakenly did not take
into account that the Internet user was only making a fair use
of the copyrighted work, my amendment ensures that the end-

user will be given notice of the action taken, and gives them a
right to initiate a process that allows them to put their material
back on-line,
without the need to hire a lawyer and go to
67
court.

Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear whether Sen. Ashcroft's
amendments accomplish his goals. Whereas an owner's take-down must
identify the "infringing" materials and assert that the use is "not
authorized" by the owner or the law, the statute does not provide that a
counter-notice can assert that the materials are "non-infringing" or that
they are "authorized by the law. ''6s Instead, an aggrieved user seeking
65. The DMCA followed a tortured path through the two chambers of Congress before
passage. The Senate passed S. 2037 on May 14, 1998 by a vote of 99-0. See 144 CONG. REC.
S4884-01, S4894 (May 14, 1998). Soon after, the House Judiciary Committee proposed a bill, H.R.
2281, that contained a version of Section 512, but which lacked any provisions for counternotification. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551(1), at 7-8 (1998) (proposed Section 512). After referral to
the House Commerce Committee, counter-notification provisions similar to the Senate version were
added to H.R. 2281. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551(1), at 15 (1998) (adding a proposed 17 U.S.C.
§512(0). On Aug. 4, 1998, the House passed H.R. 2281 by voice vote. See 144 CONG. REC. H7103
(Aug. 4, 1998). The Senate balked at the House version because of variations and additions to other
parts of the bill. See 144 CONG. REc. S9935 (Sept. 3, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft). The
Senate subsequently passed a bill that mostly replaced H.R. 2281 with the text of previously passed
S. 2037. See 144 CONG. REc. S10537 (Sept. 17, 1998). Conferees were appointed and a modified
version of H.R. 2281 was passed by both chambers. See 144 CONG. REC. S11889 (Oct. 8, 1998)
(passage by Senate); 144 CONG. REC. H10615 (Oct. 12, 1998) (passage by House). A comparison
of Ashcroft's earlier bill (S. 2037) to the passed act show no material differences regarding the
misrepresentation and counter-notification provisions, namely, what ultimately became Sections
512(f) and (g). Compare 144 CONG. REC. S4884-01, S4898 (May 14, 1998) (S. 2037 versions of
512(e) and (f)), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), (g) (enacted and codified). Thus, the Ashcroft-HatchLeahy amendment ultimately became the law.
66. 144 CONG. REc. S4884-01, S4888 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
67. Id. at S4889 (emphasis added). Ashcroft also stated:
We shouldn't allow Disney to say, "We own Donald Duck. That looks too much like
Donald," and be able to bully a little girl from having a duck on her web site. We needed
protection for the small user, not just for the big content promoters.
Even though several Judiciary Committee members claimed no amendments were
needed, I made sure that the industry compromise respected the rights of typical Intemet
users ....
Id. at S4888.
68. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(cX3XA)(iii), (v), (g)(3)(C) (West 2009).
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put-back must state that it has a good faith belief that the materials were
removed by "mistake or misidentification of the material to be removed
or disabled." 69 The statute does not expressly indicate that removal of
fair or non-infringing materials constitutes a "mistake," which may deter
users from sending counter-notices. Further, a declaration of "mistake"
must be made under penalty of perjury, further chilling counternotices. 7 0 These issues are important. If fair or non-infringing uses do
not support put-back, a user may have to go to court for a declaration of
non-infringement, which would be costly and damaging for timesensitive materials. It would also permit owners to effectively get ex
parte injunctions they could not obtain in a civil suit. In the next three
Parts of this Article, I consider these and other questions from the
perspective of intermediaries, copyright owners, and users.

II. INTERMEDIARIES AND SENATOR MCCAIN'S SUGGESTION
In this Part, I first address how the DMCA's take-down scheme has
encouraged intermediaries to offer online services. Next, I consider
whether Senator McCain's suggestion is consistent with Section 512 as
currently written. Despite the appeal of McCain's suggestion that
service providers screen take-downs aimed at political campaigns, his
approach is not feasible under current law because it would vastly
increase costs and potentially expose intermediaries to significant
copyright liability.
A.

Section 512 and remix culture

Although it would be incorrect to give sole credit to Section 512 for
the explosion of colorable fair use and remix on the web, the statute is
without a doubt a part of the equation. In a world without a copyright
safe harbor for intermediaries, development of a web services may have
been significantly chilled. Even if a majority of courts or even the
Supreme Court ultimately adopted a Netcom-like scheme for
intermediary copyright liability, the period of uncertainty would have
been significant. But under Section 512, ISPs are able to provide a wide
variety of services without being automatically liable for copyright
infringement, making possible services such as traditional website
hosting, blogging services such as Blogger and Wordpress.com, and
photo-sharing sites such as Flickr and Photobucket. As a result, we have
69. Id.§ 512(g)(3)(C).
70. Id.
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an explosion of user content including blogs and many kinds of "remix"
content such as YouTube parodies and fan fiction. 7' Although some
content becomes the subject of take-down notices, often the material
comes back online quickly. Conversely, some infringing materials
might stay online for years without objection.
The architecture engendered by Section 512 has also become
deeply entrenched in intermediary business practices.
Although
traditional ISPs typically qualify for the safe harbor, the definition of
"service provider" for hosting services is broad, including providers of
"online services or network access. 72 This permits many other entities
beyond traditional ISPs to potentially qualify for the safe harbor, such as
Amazon and eBay.73 Even copyright owners often have websites with
content, such as Disney, CBS, and Warner Bros., and considering
themselves to be service providers, post DMCA take-down policies.74
Further, the DMCA's notice and take-down scheme has been
employed in contexts where the safe harbors might not technically
apply. I will call them "quasi-DMCA" policies. 75 Thus, even though the
Internet Archive itself often posts content online (rather than merely

71. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone's A Superhero:A CulturalTheory Of
"Mary Sue" Fan Fiction As Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REv. 597, 600 ("The World Wide Web offers
writers a relatively inexpensive and simple mass distribution vehicle."); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal
Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, And A New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 653
(1997) ("Many entertainment corporations have left fan fiction alone, but a few have attempted and
are attempting to stamp out unauthorized use of their proprietary characters.").
72. For the safe harbor relating to providing hosting services, the definition of "service
provider" includes "a provider of online services or network access" or the operator of such
facilities. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(kX1)(B) (West 2009).
73. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the
definition of service provider is broad); ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d
619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) (definition is broad); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d
1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ("This definition encompasses a broad variety of Internet activities,
... and there is no doubt that Amazon fits within the definition."); Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165
F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("eBay clearly meets the DMCA's broad definition of
online 'service provider."'). But see Ginsburg, supra note 57, at 593-94 (noting that courts defming
"service provider" broadly are either at district court level, or if appellate courts, lack full analysis).
74. Disney lists a take-down policy at http://disney.go.com/corporate/privacy/terms.html.
CBS has a take-down policy at http://www.cbsinteractive.com/info/tou#tinkl0. Warner Bros. has a
copyright policy at http://www.warnerbros.com/#/page-terms-of-use/. That Disney considers itself
to be both a copyright owner and "service provider" is another irony of the information age,
considering that Disney was one of the plaintiffs in the Sony Betamax case. See Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984) (Disney a respondent). But
considering that large media companies are often both copyright owners and service providers, it
makes perfect sense that they would seek safe harbor.
75. See Mike Scott, Note, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 123-27 (2005) (noting "convergence" of online industry to using
DMCA-like policies as a matter of "best practices").
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hosting content for others), it has a quasi-DMCA take-down policy. 76
Even though Section 512 applies only to copyrights, auction site eBay's
take-down policy permits intellectual property owners to assert a wide
variety of claims beyond copyright such as trademark, patent, and right
of publicity. 77 A similar take-down policy is offered by Cafepress, a site
that makes and sells t-shirts and mugs bearing graphics uploaded by
users who create online stores on the site. 78 Such quasi-DMCA policies
make good sense by providing a good-faith take-down mechanism, even
if they do not technically fall within the scope of the Copyright Act.79
Although the question of whether quasi-DMCA policies will ultimately
insulate providers from claims of direct or secondary liability is beyond
the scope of this Article, the extent of quasi-DMCA policies shows how
pervasive the notice and take-down regime has become.
B.

SenatorMcCain'ssuggestion

To the extent that new services may have fostered fair use, they
may trace back to the protections offered to intermediaries by Section
512. But that statute can also frustrate fair use when frivolous takedowns are sent. Thus, what about Senator McCain's suggestion to
YouTube? In his letter, he asks YouTube to conduct a full legal review
of all political campaign videos that are the subject of take-down
notices:
We fully understand that YouTube may receive too many
videos, and too many takedown notices, to be able to conduct
full fair-use review of all such notices. But we believe it
would consume few resources-and provide enormous
benefit-for YouTube to commit to a full legal review of all
76. Internet Archive Terms of Use, http://www.archive.org/about/terms.php (last visited Oct.
25, 2008).
77. eBay, Notice ofClaimedlnfringement,http://pages.ebay.com/help/communityiNOCIl.pdf
(last visited Oct. 25, 2008) (blank form). Also, eBay offers a Verified Rights Owner ("VeRO")
program to facilitate cooperation and removal.
eBay, Reporting Intellectual Property
Infringements, http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/vero-rights-owner.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
78. Cafepress,
Intellectual
Property
Rights
Policy,
http://www.cafepress.com/cp/info/help/iprights.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
79. A recent case commented on eBay's VeRO program, noting that "[w]hile the law does not
impose a duty on eBay to take steps in response to generalized knowledge of infringement, the
record is clear that eBay, nevertheless, made significant efforts to protect its website from
counterfeiters." Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); but see
David Kravets, Google Profits From Typo Squatting, Report Charges, WIRED.COM, Oct. 13, 2008,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/10/google-profitin.html (Ben Edelman arguing that there is
no "notification safe harbor" to typo-squatting asserted against Google in pending class-action
lawsuit).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

17

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 5
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[3:121

takedown notices on videos posted from accounts controlled
by (at least) political candidates and campaigns. . . . If
YouTube is satisfied that the use at issue is fair, or otherwise
non-infringing, we propose that it decline to act upon the
notice. Surely the protection of core political speech, and the
protection of the central role YouTube has come to play in the
amount of
country's political discourse, is worth the small
80
additional legal work our proposal would require.

YouTube declined the offer, noting the danger of losing its safe
harbor if it failed to remove content in response to a take-down notice.8 '
YouTube nevertheless suggested that it looked forward to working with
McCain to strengthen the fair use doctrine "so that intermediaries like us
can rely on this important doctrine with a measure of business
certainty. 8 2 YouTube is correct that failing to remove materials upon
take-down would eviscerate the safe harbor.8 3 But the mere fact that a
service provider ignores a take-down notice does not prove that it is
liable, and loss of the safe harbor does not immediately establish
liability. 84 It simply means that the safe harbor is gone, and a court must
then consider whether the service provider is directly or secondarily
liable. 5
In this context, Netcom may be of some assistance. In that case, the
court recognized that an intermediary should not be held liable for
contributory infringement where the use is arguably fair:
[I]t is beyond the ability of a BBS operator to quickly and
fairly determine when a use is not infringement where there is
80. Letter from McCain, supra note 14, at 2.
81. Letter to McCain, supra note 16, at 1.
82. Id.at 3. As noted, Senator McCain voted for the DMCA. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
83. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(C) (West 2009) (noting that the safe harbor requires service
provider, "upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity").
84. The safe harbor can also be lost if the service provider fails to remove the infringement
upon gaining knowledge of it or of facts making it apparent, or if it receives a direct financial
benefit from infringing activity that it had a right and ability to control. Id.§ 512(cX1)(A), (B). As
such facts basically mirror the requirements for contributory infringement and vicarious liability, the
loss of the safe harbor in those conditions would very likely ensure liability if the use was not fair.
85. See CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that
even if the safe harbor fails, "an ISP is still entitled to all other arguments under the law-whether
by way of an affirmative defense or through an argument that conduct simply does not constitute a
prima facie case of infringement under the Copyright Act"); see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(l) (West
2009) (providing that failure to qualify for safe harbor does "not bear adversely" on any defense that
the service provider's conduct is not infringing).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/5

18

Nathenson: Looking for Fair Use in the DMCA's Safety Dance
2009]

LOOKING FOR FAIR USE IN THE DMCA's SAFETY DANCE

139

at least a colorable claim offair use. Where a BBS operator
cannot reasonably verify a claim of infringement, either
because of a possible fair use defense, the lack of copyright
notices on the copies, or the copyright holder's failure to
provide the necessary documentation to show that there is a
likely infringement, the operator's lack of knowledge will be
found reasonable and there will be no liability for

contributory infingement ....
This passage stands in stark contrast to Section 512, which never
mentions fair use. To the extent that courts might follow the approach of
Netcom, YouTube could choose to engage in case-by-case analysis,
refusing to remove videos that present possible fair use defenses. But
there are several deep flaws in this approach. First, by reverting to a preDMCA framework, YouTube would face uncertainty as to whether other
courts would follow Netcom's fair use approach8 7 Second, even if
YouTube limited analysis to political videos, it is likely that the quantity
would still be great. Third, although political speech merits high First
Amendment protection, McCain's approach would ignore other socially
valuable speech such as parody and social criticism. Fourth, the
language from Netcom (which is not binding nationwide) discusses only
contributory infringement and not vicarious or direct infringement.
More fundamentally, Senator McCain's approach ignores the fact
that the parties in the best position to consider fair-use analyses are those
with the most direct stakes: the copyright owner and the user. The fairuse factors look to matters such as market harm, the purpose of the
defendant's use, the nature of the plaintiffs work, and the amount taken
from the original8. But the owner will know more than the intermediary
about market harm. The user will know more about purpose of its use.
Both owner and user will likely know more about the nature of the
dueling works and the portion taken from the original.
Most
importantly, the stakes are the most concrete for owner and user: one
who wants to stop the use, and the other who wants to maintain it
without liability.

86. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (emphasis added).
87. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918-19 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(quoting Netcom fair use discussion and noting that it is dicta since Netcom "raised a genuine issue
of material fact regarding knowledge"), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001).
88. See generally 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2009).
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Nonetheless, Senator McCain's broader concerns for fair use might
be helped through a "fairer" interpretation of the statute. As argued in
the next two Parts, copyright owners must "stop-and-think" before
sending a take-down notice under Section 512(c); failure to do so in
cases involving fair use may be "willful blindness," giving rise to a
possible claim for a knowing material misrepresentation under Section
512(f. Regarding users, courts should clarify that counter-notifications
may be based on fair or other non-infringing uses. Thus, by my
argument, the proper route for Senator McCain would be to send a
counter-notification to obtain put-back. 89

III. COPYRIGHT OWNERS AND STOP-AND-THINK
Considering that it is not feasible under current law to expect
service providers to police bad take-down notices, we must next
consider the extent to which the existing statute can be interpreted to pay
greater respect to fair use concerns. This section considers the duties of
copyright owners. As discussed below, I conclude that owners must
consider fair and other non-infringing uses before sending take-downs,
and that willful blindness to fair use may constitute a knowing, material
misrepresentation, giving rise to liability to users who are damaged as a
result.
A.

Take-down abuse and the Lenz case

As things currently stand, not enough consideration is always given
to fair use. It is easy to imagine the following conversation happening in
a law firm today:
PARTNER: Good morning. Our client called us this morning
about a YouTube video. They want it taken down.
ASSOCIATE: Ok, sure. What's the video about?
PARTNER: The video makes fun of them.
products.

Pokes fun at their

ASSOCIATE: Anything else?

89. Unfortunately, because of Section 512's ten to fourteen day delay, time-sensitive
materials would remain offline for a troublingly long period. See id. § 512(gX2XC).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/5

20

Nathenson: Looking for Fair Use in the DMCA's Safety Dance
2009]

LOOKING FOR FAIR USE IN THE DMCA's SAFETY DANCE

PARTNER: It uses images of our client's products from the client's
website. Primafaciecopyright infringement.
ASSOCIATE: What about fair use?
PARTNER: Fair use is an affirmative defense. Just send a DMCA
take-down notice to YouTube. That should do it. Nothing will ever
come of it because users never send counter-notifications.
ASSOCIATE: Right on it!
Unfortunately, conversations like this may occur far too often in
law firms. 90 Below is an example of a take-down that I find to be
absurd, although we cannot know what level of analysis, if any, led to its
dispatch. One of my favorite YouTube videos - a mash-up of William
Shatner's spoken-word version of The Beatles' Lucy in the Sky with
Diamonds with images from Star Trek and other sources - was removed
at the apparent behest of Twentieth Century Fox. 9' The video brilliantly
puts together bits of pop culture history to comment wryly on Shatner,
Star Trek, The Beatles, and more, such as the movies Titanic and Taxi
Driver. The best I can tell from my review, it does not appear that Fox
owns Star Trek, The Beatles' music, or the Shatner album. If so, then
one would wonder what portion of the video Fox believed infringed its
copyrights. There are a number of pop culture references in the video,
but I will focus here on the film Titanic, which Fox appears to own or
co-own. Perhaps Fox was unhappy with the short segment of the video
where Leonardo DiCaprio's character "Jack" stands at the bow of the
Titanic lovingly holding William Shatner, who is digitally substituted
for Kate Winslet's "Rose." The image is accompanied by Shatner
singing "Picture yourself in a boat on a river." If so, it is a very strong
case of fair use, by parodying, among other things:

90. See Kasunic, supra note 25, at 416 n. 60 (noting that platforms like YouTube contain
significant transformative material and concluding that "it appears that many takedown notices are
automated and insufficiently reviewed by the copyright owners or their agents").
91. The video was originally posted at http://youtube.com/watch?v=L71KgFMxWyw. That
link now refers users to another page that states "This video is no longer available due to a
copyright claim by Twentieth Century Fox." As of this writing, the video can be found elsewhere.
See Posting
of William
Shatner
Lucy
in
the
Sky
with
Diamonds
to
http://video.google.com/videoplaydocid=-7258896287489458266 (May 21, 2005); see also
WILLIAM SHATNER, Spleen/Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds, on THE TRANSFORMED MAN (Decca

1968).
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Shatner's Captain Kirk character, who was a serial
womanizer;
The Beatles' song, by visually mocking the lyrics; and
Titanic, by substituting Jack's true love Rose with Shatner,
a person whose ego might compete with the equally
dominating 92Jack character, who boasts that he is "king of
the world.,

Regarding reported cases, the Stephanie Lenz case highlights a
great example of a DMCA notification that likely should never have
been sent. Lenz posted a video on YouTube of her young son dancing
called Let's Go Crazy' #1. 93
Audible in the background is
approximately twenty seconds of the Prince Song Let's Go Crazy.94 The
sound is of extremely poor quality.95 Nevertheless, Universal sent 96a
take-down notice to YouTube and the video was promptly removed.
The video was restored after Lenz sent a counter-notice claiming fair
use. 97 Represented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lenz filed
suit against Universal for sending a baseless take-down notice, in
violation of Section 512(f)'s prohibition on "knowing material
misrepresentations."9 Section 512(f) is a rarely invoked civil cause of

92. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that a Two Live
Crew parody of song "Pretty Woman" can be fair use).
93. See Posting of Let's Go Crazy #1 to http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NIKfJHFWIhQ
(Feb. 7, 2007) [hereinafter "Lenz Video"].
94. PRINCE AND THE REVOLUTION, Let's Go Crazy, on MUSIC FROM THE MOTION PICTURE
"PURPLE RAIN," (Warner Bros. 1984).

95. Lenz Video, supra note 93.
96. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
97. Id. The video remains online as of this writing. See Lenz Video, supra note 93.
98. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-53. Section 512(f) states in full:
(f) Misrepresentations.--Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this
section(1) that material or activity is infringing, or
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification,
shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the
alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or
by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the
service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to
the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or
ceasing to disable access to it.
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(0 (West 2009). Under Section 512, reliance should be generally easy for a user
to establish, as the service provider typically takes things down quickly upon demand from the
copyright owner. Damages will vary, and in many cases may be nominal. Attorneys' fees,
however, is a major plus for damaged persons. In addition, both lawyers and clients may be
potentially liable to the extent either make or cause a knowing material misrepresentation, since the

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/5

22

Nathenson: Looking for Fair Use in the DMCA's Safety Dance
20091

LOOKING FOR FAIR USE IN THE DMCA's SAFETY DANCE

action for users, intermediaries,
or owners damaged by
misrepresentations in connection with take-downs or counter-notices. 99
Universal moved to dismiss.' The motion was denied, with the
court holding that copyright owners must consider fair use before
sending a take-down.101 The complaint was sufficient, by alleging that
Universal deliberately ignored fair use, and instead acted to promote the
"personal agenda" of Prince. 10 2 Although the court doubted Lenz could
prove the "subjective bad faith" needed under Ninth Circuit precedent to
prove a "knowing material misrepresentation," it held that Lenz stated a
claim.'0 3
B.

Owners must considerfair use

For the reasons stated by the court and more, I think Lenz got it
right. First, the language of Section 512 and structure of the Copyright
Act make it clear that a copyright owner must consider fair and other
non-infringing uses as part of a statutorily compliant DMCA take-down
notice. Lenz noted that a proper notification must include, inter alia, a
statement by the owner that it has a "good faith belief' that the use is not
authorized by "the law."' 4 But a determination that a use is not

statute makes liable "[a]ny person."
99. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding statute requires subjective actual knowledge, unknowing mistake not enough); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that statute
requires lack of "subjective good faith belief'); Dudnikov v. MGA Entr't, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d
1010, 1012 (D. Colo. 2005) (holding that good faith belief of infringement means no liability);
Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (in case decided
before Rossi, holding that "'[kinowingly' means that a party actually knew, should have known if it
acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in
good faith, that it was making misrepresentations"); Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board, Inc., No. 00
CIV. 4660(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (holding no liability "for
merely sending a letter that constitutes insufficient notification"); see also Matt Williams, The Truth
and the "Truthiness" About Knowing Material Misrepresentations,9 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007)
(discussing section 512(f)).
100. An earlier complaint had been dismissed with leave to amend. Lenz v. Universal Music
Corp., No. C 07-03783 JF, 2008 WL 962102, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008).
101. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-57. A motion to certify for interlocutory appeal was later
denied. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-3783 JF (RS), 2008 WL 4790669 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 28, 2008).
102. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. A press statement issued by Universal stated broadly that
as a "matter of principle," "Prince believes it is wrong for YouTube, or any other user-generated
site, to appropriate his music without his consent." Id. at 1152.
103. Id. at 1156. "An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a
takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a
misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) .... " Id. at 1154-55.
104. Id. at 1154 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)).
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authorized involves more than merely glancing at the exclusive
copyright rights listed in Section 106.105 As Lenz pointed out, the fair
use statute in Section 107 provides that "[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work.
. is not an infringement of copyright."'16 In addition, though not noted
by the court, section 106 expressly states that the copyright owner's
exclusive rights are "[slubject to section[] 107," which is the fair use
statute. 0 7 Simply put,10 8a fair use is a non-infringing use, and to claim
otherwise is incorrect.
Second, the nature of the DMCA take-down procedure demands
that the copyright owner consider fair use as a matter of procedural
fairness. It is true that courts typically treat fair use as a defense that can
rebut a prima facie case of infringement.
But this approach is
inappropriate in the context of DMCA notifications. The process in
Section 512 is in essence an ex parte adjudication, one that lacks the
procedural protections of civil litigation. 1°9 In an ex parte proceeding
seeking a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), the plaintiff can get
relief only if "specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly
show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result." 110 But a take-down notice need not allege irreparable harm,
needing instead to baldly assert that the materials are infringing. In an
ex parte TRO proceeding, the movant must "certifqy] in writing any
efforts made to give notice and the reasons why notice should not be
required.""' With take-downs, the copyright owner has no duty to
contact the user before sending a take-down notice," 2 and the service

105. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2009) (listing exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation,
public distribution, public display, public performance, and public performance of sound recordings
by digital audio transmission).
106. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107) (italics added).
107. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2009) (emphasis added). Even the limited moral rights
contained in Section 106A indicate that they are subject to the fair use statute. Id. § 106A(a).
108. The same can be said of other reasons that undercut claimed infringement, such as lack of
ownership or that the disputed use does not implicate one of the exclusive rights.
109. See Pollack, supra note 8, at 561 (noting the "extraordinary lack of court protection
available to the subscriber before s/he is silenced"); Scott, supra note 75, at 128-29 (even in federal
court, a mere complaint does not merit "automatic granting" of relief).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(bXIXA).
11. Id. 65(bX1)(B).
112. Contra id. 1 (cXIX2) (providing that a motion for sanctions under Rule II may not be
filed unless motion served on opposing party twenty-one days earlier); id.37(aXI), (d)(1)(B) (party
moving for motion to compel or for certain discovery sanctions must certify it has "in good faith
conferred or attempted to confer" with the opposing party before seeking court action).
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provider need not contact the user until after
the take-down is complete,
13
making the process like a prior restraint."
In an ex parte TRO proceeding, a neutral decision-maker evaluates
the claim, but in the take-down context, the service provider acts as an
automaton, blindly and necessarily taking down the materials at the
owner's behest. 14 Even worse, while a judge in a civil proceeding must
be impartial and unbiased, a service provider has tremendous incentive
to comply with the take-down notice so that it avoids liability."'
Indeed, the service provider is potentially adverse to both the present
party (the owner) and an absent person (the user), and has maximum
incentive to do anything to avoid liability. As YouTube counsel noted in
response to Senator McCain's letter, if "service providers do not remove
the content
in response to [a take-down] notice," they lose their safe
6
harbor. 11
Thus, take-downs not only lack the procedural protections of an ex
parte TRO proceeding, 1 7 but typically become de facto ex parte
seizures as well since few users write counter-notifications." 1 8 The
initial take-down notice accomplishes the same result as a civil litigation
that proceeds almost immediately from filing to judgment to execution.
In a civil litigation, consideration of fair use is a safeguard that serves as
one of copyright law's "built-in First Amendment accommodations."" 9

113. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2)(A) (West 2009) (service provider must "take[] reasonable steps
promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the material"). In an ex
parte proceeding, the movant must also typically issue security such as a bond. FED. R. CIV. P.
65(c). Reading the statute to require pre-consideration of fair use may avoid some potential
problems with due process. Laura Quilter states that Section 512 "is effectively a prior restraint
with no judicial review." Quilter Comments, supranote 12, at 1028; see also Pollack, supranote 8,
at 573 (Section 512 impinges on First Amendment liberty interest).
114. Indeed, if the service provider refuses or even takes too long, it may find itself subject to
liability for copyright infringement.
115. In fact, the statute generally immunizes the provider from any liability to anyone "for any
claim based on the service provider's good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or
activity claimed to be infringing ... , regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately
determined to be infringing." 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(1) (West 2009).
116. Letter to McCain, supra note 16, at 1.
117. In the trademark context, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d) (West 2009) (detailed procedures for
proceedings requesting ex parte seizures of goods bearing counterfeit trademarks). The protections
of Rule 65 also apply to copyright impoundments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(0; see also 17 U.S.C.A. §
503 (West 2009) (copyright impoundments).
118. A TRO must typically be dissolved after ten days. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2). With takedowns, if a counter-notification is received, the materials must be restored within ten to fourteen
days of receiving the counter-notification. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2XC) (West 2009).
119. Eldred v. Ashcrofi, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003); see also Computer Communications
Ind.
Ass'n,
Abstract:
Copyright
(May
2008),
http://www.ccianet.org/docs/abstracts/2008/Copyright2008.pdf ("According to the Supreme Court
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But permitting an owner to ignore fair use could eviscerate fair use in
the take-down context. Considering that fair use is non-infringing use,
that the procedure excludes the alleged infringer until after the removal,
and that the "adjudicator" is itself potentially
liable if it fails to act, the
20
copyright owner must consider fair use.'
Third, the structure of Section 512 makes it clear that an owner
must make a pre-filing investigation. A proper notification is essentially
certified by including matters such as signature, contact information,
identification of the owner's work and of the infringing materials, a
statement that the use is unauthorized, and statements of good faith,
authority, and accuracy. 121 Such requirements are similar to the
22
certification requirements in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 11 requires a lawyer to conduct a reasonable investigation into the
law and the facts before presenting any paper to the court. 23 Signing
and filing a paper such as a complaint is a certification that there has
been such an investigation and that the paper is not filed for improper
purposes. 124 Some courts have held that a lawyer can violate Rule 11 by
failing to investigate, even if the lawyer "through sheer fortuity" turns
out to be correct. 125 Although sanctions for violations "must be limited
to what suffices to deter repetition" of the wrongful conduct, in extreme
cases, sanctions can even include dismissal. 26 As I suggest in the next

in Eldred, fair use is one of the 'traditional First Amendment safeguards' that ensure the
constitutionality of copyright law.") (quoting Eldred,537 U.S. at 220).
120. If Section 512(g) does not permit a counter-notice on the basis of fair or non-infringing

use, the aggrieved user's only remedy would be to file suit in court. Yet this would eviscerate the
goal of Senator Ashcroft's amendment, i.e., to make sure that fair users would not be required to go
to court to protect themselves. See supra Part .C; see also Pollack, supra note 8, at 572-76
(arguing that Section 512 impinges on First Amendment liberty interest and recommending changes

to statute).
121. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi) (West 2009).
122. See Scott, supra note 75, at 159 (suggesting Section 512 be amended to include Rule I I's
reasonable inquiry requirement).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
124. Id.

125. Lichtenstein v. Consol. Serv. Group, Inc., 173 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1999); Garr v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1279 (3d Cir. 1994) ("a signer making an inadequate inquiry into the
sufficiency of the facts and law underlying a document will not be saved from a Rule II sanction by
the stroke of luck that the document happened to be justified"). Not all courts agree. See Moore v.
Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d 431,435 (9th Cir. 1996) ("We do little to undermine the deterrent goals
of the Rule by not sanctioning complaints which have merit on their face."). See generally
RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 151 (updated 4th ed. 2008)

(citing Lichtenstein and Moore and noting split).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (c)(4); see also Jerold S. Solovy & Laura A. Kaster, 2 MOoRE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § I 1.24[2] ("Dismissal is a severe sanction, but it is available when appropriate

to deter the sanctionable conduct.").
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section, failure to investigate may constitute willful blindness, possibly
leading to a knowing material misrepresentation under Section 512(f).
C.

Willful blindness as a knowing material misrepresentation

A failure to consider fair use may be considered willful blindness,
which in turn may satisfy the knowledge element of 512(f). In Lenz, the
plaintiff argued, and the court agreed, that failure to consider fair use
127
was deliberate ignorance, thus constituting a misrepresentation.
Willful blindness - also known by terms such as deliberate indifference
and reckless disregard 128 - is typically used to prove knowledge in
criminal law. "Under the doctrine of willful blindness or deliberate
ignorance, which is used more often in the criminal context than in civil
cases, knowledge can be imputed to a party who knows of a high
probability of illegal conduct and purposely contrives to avoid learning
of it.' 129 As stated by another court:
[A] deliberate indifference instruction is not the same as a
constructive

knowledge instruction.

.

.

.

A deliberate

indifference instruction is used to inform the jury that a
defendant's actions, or failures to act, combined with other
circumstances may suffice to prove that a defendant had
actual knowledge of a fact.' 30
Willful blindness is not limited to criminal cases, and has been used
in copyright and trademark cases. 31 As held by the United States Court

127. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
("sufficient allegations of bad faith and deliberate ignorance of fair use to survive the instant motion
to dismiss"); Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, Lenz v. Universal
Music Corp., No. C 07-03783 JF, at 18 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 20, 2008) ("Rossi does not authorize willful
blindness"), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/lenz_v_universalLenzOpp_MTD.pdf.
128. As well as other terms such as "conscious avoidance," "contrived ignorance," "deliberate
ignorance," and "willful ignorance."
129. Williams v. Obstfeld, 314 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002); see also David Luban,
Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 959 (1999) ("In essence, the doctrine states that willful
ignorance is equivalent to knowledge. Self-generated deniability doesn't work: you can be
convicted of knowingly committing a crime even if you don't commit it knowingly-provided that
you contrived your own ignorance.").
130. United States v. Falcon, 477 F.3d 573, 578-79 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v.
Parker, 364 F.3d 934, 947 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2004)).
131. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing willful
blindness in copyright case); see also Island Software and Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
413 F.3d 257, 263 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that willfulness requires either actual awareness or that
defendant acted with 'reckless disregard' for, or 'willful blindness' to, the copyright holder's
rights"); Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1994) ("a
finding of willfulness is justified if the infringer knows that its conduct is an infringement or if the
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of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, "[w]illful blindness is knowledge, in
copyright law.., as it is in the law generally."' 3 2 All that is needed is "a
deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge."' 133 As Black's Law
Dictionary aptly puts it, willful blindness is "[d]eliberate avoidance of
knowledge of a crime.., by failing to make a reasonable inquiry about
' 34
suspected wrongdoing despite being aware that it is highly probable."'
Willful blindness is particularly apt in the context of take-down
notices. Although typically used to show knowledge of illegal conduct,
for take-down notices, willful blindness should be used to show that a
copyright owner intentionally blinded itself to potentially legal conduct
of the user. In a notification, the owner must state that they have a
"good faith belief' that the use is unauthorized. But as stated by
135
numerous courts, willful blindness is not compatible with good faith.
In contexts where the use suggests that fair use may be applicable, a
decision to ignore fair use cannot be good faith. Sending a take-down
under such circumstances is bad faith, and is a subjective
misrepresentation. As a matter of procedural fairness, this analysis must
be correct. The weakest stakeholder in take-down notices is the user.

infringer has acted in reckless disregard of the copyright owner's right") (internal quotes omitted).
132. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650; see also Hard Rock Cafe Lic. Corp. v. Concession Svcs., Inc.,
955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cit. 1992) ("we have held that willful blindness is equivalent to actual
knowledge for purposes of the Lanham Act").
133. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650. "Willful blindness requires 'more than mere negligence or
mistake' and does not lie unless the defendant knew of a high probability of illegal conduct and
purposefully contrived to avoid learning of it, for example, by failing to inquire further out of fear of
the result of the inquiry." Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(quoting Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1369-70 (S.D. Ga. 2003)).
134. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Similarly, under a "Jewell" or "Deliberateindifference" instruction,
If a defendant claims ignorance of some fact essential to the crime, such as not knowing
that a particular bag contained drugs, but the surrounding circumstances would put a
reasonable person on notice that there was a high probability of illegality, as when the
defendant has taken the bag from a known drug-dealer and has noticed the smell of
marijuana coming from the bag, then the court may instruct the jury that it is entitled to
infer the defendant's guilty knowledge if the defendant deliberately avoided knowledge
of the critical facts.
Id.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2008) ("because deliberate
ignorance of a duty to pay taxes is contrary to a good-faith belief, the willful blindness instruction
may be given in appropriate tax evasion cases"); United States v. Muriel, 48 Fed. Appx. 102, at *3
(5th Cir. 2002) (non-precedential) ("deliberate ignorance of fraudulent conduct is at odds with a
contention of subjective good faith"); United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181,
1194 (2d Cir. 1989) ("This Court has repeatedly approved use of a conscious-avoidance charge in a
variety of cases in which there was a genuine issue as to the defendant's good-faith ignorance of the
illegality of his conduct."); In re Harbour, 845 F.2d 1254, 1258 (4th Cir. 1988) ("willful ignorance
in the face of facts which cried out for investigation may not support a finding of good faith").
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149

Section 512 requires the intermediary to remain ignorant of any
infringement if they want to retain the safe harbor. 36 To permit the
copyright owner also to remain willfully ignorant to fair use leaves the
user with little protection.
However, it must be noted that in Rossi v. MPAA,137 the Ninth
Circuit stated that Section 512(f) "imposes a subjective good faith
requirement upon copyright owners," violated only when the owner
makes "a knowing misrepresentation., 13 8 Further, said the court, an
unknowing mistake would not lead to legal liability, "even if the
copyright owner acted unreasonably in making the mistake.' 3 9 Instead,
held the court, "there must be a demonstration of some actual knowledge
of misrepresentation on the part of the copyright owner."' 140 Does that
mean that an owner who intentionally chooses to ignore fair use lacks
actual knowledge of a misrepresentation: in other words, see no evil,
hear no evil, speak no evil? I think it does not. It is debatable whether
Rossi's requirement of actual knowledge is dicta. 141 Rossi did not
involve a claim under Section 512(f); rather, the owner was sued based
on a number of state-law theories. 42 But my approach does not require
disagreement with Rossi. Even if "actual" knowledge is required, it
should be satisfied by willful blindness, a knowing failure to
acknowledge or consider fair use under circumstances when a colorable
fair use argument is presented by the facts. The rationale, facts, or
outcome of Rossi do not demand a different result, especially
considering that the dispute in that case did not present facts even
remotely suggesting willful blindness: as noted by the Rossi court, the
136. Although a service provider can try to track down infringement, failure to remove any
such content quickly would risk losing the safe harbor.
137. 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). In a case decided while Rossi was pending, a lower court
in that circuit held that "'[k]nowingly' means that a party actually knew, should have known if it
acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in
good faith, that it was making misrepresentations." Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing various definitions in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(8th ed.2004)).
138. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004-05.
139. Id. at 1005.
140. Id.
141. See Williams, supra note 99, at 29 (noting that although Rossi arguably contains dicta, the
decision is correct because 512(c)(3)(A)(v) and 512(f) are two sides of "same coin"); see also
Pollack, supra note 8, at 562 (noting that Rossi "properly concluded that the 'good faith belief in
infringement required to support a take down notice was purely subjective").
142. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1002 (noting causes of action). The court, however, was correct in
concluding that Sections 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (requirement of good faith claim of infringement) and
512(f) (knowing material misrepresentations of infringement) should be read together because each
deals squarely with the owner's claim of infringement.
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facts of the case - where the website at issue advertised "Full Length
Downloadable Movies" - practically screamed out infringement. 143 In
contrast, I believe that where the facts scream out non-infringement, an
owner who deliberately ignores fair use has satisfied Section 512(f)'s
knowledge requirement.
D.

Consideringfair use is not burdensome

One might object that fair use is notoriously uncertain and that it is
therefore unfair to conclude that ignoring fair use is misrepresentation.
As noted by Justice Blackmun, fair use is the "'most troublesome' area
of copyright law.' 44 But that would misunderstand the nature of
misrepresentations under Section 512(0. The answer is not that the
owner must make an exhaustive or correct fair-use determination, but
that it must consider fair use where it is reasonably presented.
Moreover, if fair use is reasonably debatable, a take-down can be sent in
good faith. As noted by the Lenz court in a subsequent opinion denying
permission to appeal,
The Court did not hold that every takedown notice must be
preceded by a full fair use investigation.
Rather, it
recognized, as it has previously, that in a given case fair use
may be so obvious that a copyright owner could not
reasonably
believe that actionable infringement was taking
45
place.

143. The owner's initial investigation in Rossi screamed out a high likelihood of infringement,
where the alleged infringer's website stated, "Join to download full length movies online now! new
movies every month," "Full Length Downloadable Movies," and "NOW DOWNLOADABLE,"
along with "graphics for a number of'movies. Id.at 1002. Although "no movies could actually be
downloaded" from the site, id. at 1003, the defendant's "customers often believed that actual movies
were available for downloading on his website." Id. at 1005. Such circumstances show that the
take-down was sent in good faith. See id.("The unequivocal language used by [the alleged
infringer on his site] not only suggests that conclusion, but virtually compels it.").
144. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir.
1939)); cf Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("An uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better
than no privilege at all.") (discussing attorney-client privilege).
145. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-3783 JF (RS), 2008 WL 4790669, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 28, 2008) (citation omitted). Although the court felt that such cases may be "extremely
rare," id.,
I am not as optimistic. It may be that a large number of transformative non-commercial
works are removed pursuant to take-downs. Unfortunately, since the take-down process is private
and there is no requirement of maintaining public records or statistics, one can't be sure how many
such works are removed. See Urban & Quilter, supranote 12, at 623.
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By way of analogy, under Rule 11, a proper investigation prior to
filing a complaint need not be perfect or exhaustive. All that is required
is an "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances."' 46 In the context of
take-down notices, considering fair use must be part of that
investigation. As noted by Lenz:
The DMCA already requires copyright owners to make an
initial review of the potentially infringing material prior to
sending a takedown notice; indeed, it would be impossible to
meet any of the requirements of Section 512(c) without doing
so. A consideration of the applicability 47of the fair use
doctrine simply is part of that initial review.
148
In a court proceeding, a plaintiff may not have to negate fair use.
But a take-down notice side-steps the need for the owner to make any
affirmative showing at all beyond satisfying the statutory elements of a
take-down notice. As such, the copyright owner must consider fair use
or other reasons why the use is non-infringing. Just as a bald failure to
investigate may violate Rule 11, a blind failure to consider fair use
where it is arguably applicable should violate Section 512(f), at a
minimum, if the use turns out to be fair and the user is thereby damaged.
In practice, consideringfair use will not be onerous. Proper inquiry
into the facts and law is part of an attorney's normal due diligence prior
to sending a demand letter or take-down notice. There is no excuse for a
lack of competence, and an attorney who sends a take-down notice
without knowledge of basic copyright law breaches his duty of
competence. 49 As noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate against an attorney
who filed a copyright suit when he "had not sufficiently investigated the
facts of the case nor had he educated himself well enough as to
copyright law."' 50 And since fair uses are not infringing, how can a
lawyer not consider fair use when signing a take-down that must include
the statutory statement that he has "a good faith belief that use of the

146. FED. R. CIv.P. 11(b).
147. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
148. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that in preliminary injunction proceeding, once plaintiff shows likelihood of success on the
merits, burden shifts to defendant to show that its fair use defense will succeed).
149. Indeed, the duty of competence is the very first rule listed in the ABA model rules. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.").
150. Zuk v. Eastern Pa. Psych. Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 1996).
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material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright
owner, its agent, or the law."''
Importantly, I emphasize that lawyers must consider fair and other
non-infringing uses, not that they always get it right. When a lack of fair
use is obvious, its consideration will be properly fleeting. Other times,
circumstances will give rise to the need for further inquiries, such as red
flags concerning validity or ownership, concerning various defenses, and
conceming fair use.'5 2 The following sub-sections contain illustrative
examples of obvious infringement, obvious non-infringement (for a
variety of reasons), and strong versus debatable cases of fair use.'53 As
noted in the Introduction, this Article assumes a basic knowledge of
copyright law, so I will not engage in extended fair use analyses in the
examples provided below. In fact, these analyses are done purposely in
a cursory manner to highlight the fact that it is not difficult to identify
cases where fair use may arguably exist. Where fair or other non-

151. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
152. I reject the analysis in Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment,where the court stated "Plaintiffs
have not presented any authority that supports applying a different standard than subjective good
faith belief to lawyers trained in IP law." 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1013 (D. Colo. 2005). Dudnikov
forgets that an assertion of "good faith" is inconsistent with willful blindness. Indeed, the epitome
of bad faith is willfully ignoring something that screams out for your attention. If anything, the
knowledge of an I attorney makes it far easier to find bad faith, and thus a knowing
misrepresentation. But the knowledge of intellectual property lawyers does not permit general
practitioners to ignore their own duties of competence and give copyright advice without proper
inquiry.
153. The fair use statute states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2009). As indicated in the statute, the factors are non-exclusive. In
practice, the first and fourth factors tend to be the most important. See American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) (characterizing first and fourth factors as
"important"); Barton Beebe, An EmpiricalStudy of US. Copyright FairUse Opinions, 1978-2005,
156 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 555, 587 (2008) (noting the extent of discussion in opinions supports
conclusion that first and fourth factors "drive the outcome of the test").
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infringing use may exist, willful blindness to such issues may be a
knowing material misrepresentation.
1. Likely infringement - posting entire commercial works
In many cases, the lack of fair use will be obvious. For example,
Guns N' Roses' album Chinese Democracy was posted online before its
release. 154 There was no fair use argument made, nor could there be
under these facts. 55 Much the same can be said about a DMCA notice
sent to Google concerning a blog that provided downloads of the movie
Shrek the Third.156 In such circumstances, the lack of fair use will be
obvious. Counsel would likely spend at most a moment on fair use,
instantly realizing that such uses simply are not fair. Further, even a
failure to consider fair use would not lead to misrepresentation liability.
These facts do not give rise to an obligation to inquire further about fair
use, so no willful blindness would occur. Also, a necessary element of a
Section 512(f) claim - injury - would be lacking, because the user
157
would have no right under copyright law to post such materials.
2. Likely non-infringement - no valid copyright
In contrast, it is equally easy to imagine circumstances where an
attorney should inquire further, and the failure to do so might be willful
blindness if it constitutes a material misrepresentation that causes injury.
For example, a lawyer should reasonably inquire to determine that its
client owns the copyright and that the copyright is valid. The extent of
this inquiry will vary with circumstances. In some cases, written
assignments will exist. In others, circumstances may support a
conclusion that grounds will exist to assert ownership. But in others,
circumstances should give an attorney pause. For example, the
purchaser of a globe that once belonged to Adolph Hitler recently

154. David Kravets, Guns N' Roses Uploader to Plead Guilty, WIRED, Nov. 10, 2008,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/1 1/guns-n-roses-up.html.
155. The uploader pleaded guilty to criminal copyright infringement. See id; see also Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985) (holding that unpublished
nature of work is "key" but not determinative factor against fair use).
156. DMCA Notification from Paramount Pictures Corp. to Google (May 22, 2007),
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgiNoticelD=7363.
157. Even though a knowing material misrepresentation is a necessary element of Section
512(f), it is not sufficient by itself to state a claim, as the user would also have to show it was
injured by the misrepresentation. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(f) (West 2009) (providing that damages and
attorneys' fees for user "who is injured by such misrepresentation" via removal by the
intermediary).
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asserted copyright in the globe, a questionable claim considering that the
purchaser of an object obtains no U.S. copyright from the mere act of
purchase."5 8 Also, the U.S. Air Force sent a DMCA notice to YouTube,
demanding removal of a video containing content owned by the Air
Force. 159 But works created by the U.S. government do not qualify for
copyright, although the government can be assigned copyrights of
others. 160 Did the Air Force own a copyright? Such circumstances
should put counsel on notice1 that copyright rights might be lacking,
requiring further investigation. 61
3. Likely fair use - noncommercial parody or criticism
In other cases, the fair use argument will be strong. Unfortunately,
sometimes demands are sent even when fair use is strong. Two
examples noted in the introduction are Chilling Effects founder Wendy
Seltzer and Senator John McCain. Seltzer, a strong fair-use advocate,
posted to YouTube a short clip from an NFL game containing the NFL's
overblown copyright notice. 162 During the video, an announcer states
"This telecast is copyrighted by the NFL for the private use of our
audience. Any other use of this telecast or any pictures, descriptions, or
accounts of the game without the NFL's consent is prohibited.' ' 63 The
breadth of the NFL's copyright claim is mind-boggling. By the NFL's
assertion, any news account or photograph of the game - even if not
based on the telecast - would require permission from the NFL. Such an
assertion is baseless, considering that "[t]he most fundamental axiom of
copyright law is that '[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he
narrates. 111164

2,
2009,
NY POST, Jan.
Globe a No-No,
158. See Achtung! Tom's
http://www.nypost.com/seven/01022009/gossip/pagesix/achtung__tomsglobeano no_146812.ht
m; see also 17 U.S.C. § 202 (transfer of ownership of object does not impart copyright ownership).
5,
2008),
Force
to
YouTube
(Mar.
159. Letter
from
U.S.
Air
http://chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticelD=17583.
160. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West 2009).
161. According to Wired's Threat Level, an Air Force spokesperson said that "any intellectual
property claim should have gone through his office, and none did." Kevin Poulsen, Air Force
Cyber Command's New Weapon: DMCA Notices, WIRED THREAT LEVEL, Mar.

7, 2008,

http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/03/air-force-cyber.html.
162. Posting of Super Bowl Highlights, supra note 13; see also supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
163. Posting of Super Bowl Highlights, supra note 13.
164. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991)
(quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
Although one court has permitted protection against misappropriation of "hot news," this protection
is limited to misappropriation of time-sensitive information by a direct competitor. National
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Seltzer's purpose in posting the short clip to YouTube was to
showcase the NFL's overblown claim, in short, to criticize the NFL.
Such use is classic fair use. 165 The posting was not done for monetary
gain, took only a few seconds from the game, and in no way would
supplant the market for NFL broadcasts. In short, it was a very strong
case of fair use. Yet the NFL compounded potential copyright misuse
66
by sending not one, but two DMCA take-down notices to YouTube.
67
The materials were restored after Seltzer sent counter-notifications.
Unfortunately, a less savvy
user would likely be cowed by the NFL and
68
big-money law firms.1
Regarding Senator McCain, Fox News objected to McCain about
one of his campaign commercials because it contained "a few seconds of
his participation in a Fox-sponsored presidential debate.' '169 Although
Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997). The NFL's copyright
announcement is not "hot news," and even if it was, Seltzer is a fair-use advocate and law professor,
not a competitor of the NFL.
165. The preamble to Section 107 lists a number of uses as possible fair use: "purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research." 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2009).
166. See Wendy Seltzer, NFL: Second Down and Goal?, WENDY'S BLOG: LEGAL TAGS, Apr.
5,
2007,
http://wendy.seltzer.org/blog/archives/2007/04/05/nflsecond down andgoal.html.
Further posts by Professor Seltzer about the take-downs and counter-notifications can be found at
http://wendy.seltzer.org/blog/dmca-nfl (last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
167. See Seltzer, supra note 166. In 2007, the Computer & Communications Industry
Association ("CCIA") filed a complaint against the NFL, Major League Baseball, and others with
the Federal Trade Commission. In re Misrepresentation of Consumer Fair Use and Related Rights
(complaint dated Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/070801CCA.pdf; see also
Computer & Communications Industry Association, CCIA Files FTC Complaint against
NBC/Universal,MLB, the NFL and Others Alleging Years of Consumer Deception, Aug 1, 2007,
available at http://www.ccianet.org/artmanager/publish/news/FTCcopyrightcomplaint.shtml.
Although FTC staff decided "not to recommend" formal action at that time, it noted that
"[w]idespread use of inaccurate copyright warnings could contribute to consumers'
misunderstanding" of consumer protections under copyright law. Opinion letter from Mary K.
Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Advertising Practices, Federal Trade Commission, to Computer &
Communications Ind. Assoc. (Dec. 6, 2007), at 1, 5, http://www.ftc.gov/os/closingsstaff/
071206ccia.pdf. The letter noted that no formal determination had been made, thus leaving open
the possibility of future action. Id.at 6.
168. The copyright claim underlying the NFL's notifications are even less meritorious than the
copyright suit Mattel filed against Tom Forsythe, a photographer who sold photos of dismembered
Barbie dolls posed with kitchen appliances. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the artist had
engaged in fair use. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.
2003). On remand, the district court granted Forsythe attorney's fees under Section 505 of the
Copyright Act. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, No. CV99-8543RSWL(RZX),
2004 WL 1454100, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 21, 2004) ("Plaintiff is a sophisticated entity with access to
good legal representation. Plaintiff's claims were not in an unsettled area of law and had little
likelihood of success. Plaintiff's copyright claims, therefore, were frivolous.").
169. Sarah Lai Stirland, McCain's Disputed Fox Debate Clip a Viral Hit Online, WIRED
THREAT LEvEL, Oct. 26, 2007, http://blog.wired.com/2Tstroke6/2007/10/mccains-dispute.html;
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the complaint was apparently to McCain rather than YouTube, it
provides a good illustrative example. Fox News' objection is also
highly questionable, considering that McCain's use was for political
purposes, the portion taken was minimal, the materials were factual and
of historic relevance, and the use did not supplant the market for the
original. 70 One wonders whether Fox's lawyers considered fair use in
any serious way.
Similarly, fair use arguments in the Lenz case are strong. Lenz's
video is non-commercial, has poor audio quality, and uses only a small
portion of the song Let's Go Crazy. Moreover, Lenz was making a joke
(albeit a gentle one) at the song's expense by displaying her young son
himself going crazy by dancing to the song. 171 Although the original
work is creative rather than factual, Lenz's use is non-commercial and in
no way competes with the market for the original. Simply put, nobody
will prefer Lenz's video to the original CD or an iTunes download. One
wonders whether Universal's lawyers did not consider fair use, or
figured that Lenz - like most users - would rather fold than fight.

4. Unclear fair use - the case of The Grey Album
But I recognize that fair use can be complex and debatable. Under
such circumstances, a lawyer who considers fair use and still decides to
send a take-down would not violate Section 512(f), even if a court may
ultimately later disagree with the lawyer's fair use analysis. For
example, in 2002, Brian Burton, a musician better known as Danger
Mouse (now half of the famous group Gnarls Barkley) released The
Grey Album, a mash-up of The Beatles' White Album with Jay Z's Black
Album. 172 The album brilliantly overlays Jay Z's vocals with samples
Jim Rutenberg, Fox Orders Halt to McCain Ad, THE CAUCUS (N.Y. TIMES POLITICS BLOG), Oct.

25, 2007, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/fox-orders-halt-to-mccain-ad/.
170. Anyone wanting to watch the whole debate would not be interested in watching the few
seconds excerpted in the ad. Fox suggested, likelypost hoc, that McCain's use was objectionable
because it was "commercial." See Stirland, supra note 169. But even if the snippet of the Fox
debate video (containing McCain's own comments) was used in part to raise campaign funds, it is
hard to see how it would prevent fair use if there is no market harm, which is the case here. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (holding that duplication of original
in entirety makes market harm likely, but where "second use is transformative, market substitution
is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred").
171. Although the infamous Dr. Seuss case concluded that a parody must target the original at
least in part, that occurred here, as Lenz's video holds the Prince song up to gentle and direct
ridicule. See Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir.
1997) ("unless the plaintiffs copyrighted work is at least in part the targetof the defendant's satire,
then the defendant's work is not a 'parody' in the legal sense") (emphasis in original).
172. The Grey Album Legal Battle Summarized, http://www.illegal-art.org/audio/grey.html
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from White Album.
In my mind, this is fair use. It's highly
transformative, creating a new work. But fair use here is less clear. The
Grey Album doesn't directly comment on or criticize the original works;
instead, the jist of mash-ups is that they juxtapose disparate works
in a
73
way that arguably comments on both in a "quasi-parody" fashion.'
My purpose here is not to prove that mash-ups are or are not fair
use. Rather, an owner's lawyer might reasonably conclude that fair use
issues are sufficiently uncertain that a take-down notice would not be
unwarranted. In fact, take-down and cease and desist letters were sent
seeking removal of The Grey Album, 174 including in response to "Grey
Tuesday," a day of mass protest where the album was made available for
download from over 150 websites.175 Legal or not, the album is still
available for download from a fair-use advocacy76 site, apparently without
further complaints from any copyright owners.
IV. USERS, COUNTER-NOTIFICATION, AND FAIR USE

Requiring lawyers to stop-and-think about fair use will prevent
some notices from being sent. But it will not cure all problems with
take-downs. Lawyers may still fail to consider fair use, so the damaging
take-down is sent. Or lawyers might consider fair use and conclude in
good faith that fair use is by no means clear. 177 Also, unrepresented
owners may not realize that their take-downs are improper. 178 In such
circumstances, the take-down notice will be sent, and pursuant to the
"safety dance," the content will be removed. Can the user get the

(last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
173. Cf Aaron Power, 15 Megabytes Of Fame: A Fair Use Defense For Mash-Ups As DJ
Culture Reaches Its Postmodern Limit, 35 Sw. U. L. REv. 577, 600 (noting that mash-ups may
appear to be "open and shut" infringement, but arguing that they may fall into a "quasi-parody"
category of works that could merit fair use protection).
174. See,
e.g.,
DMCA
Notice
to
Waxy.org
(Feb.
13,
2004),
http://chillingeffects.org/fairuse/notice.cgi?NoticelD= 1093; Letter from J. Christopher Jensen (Feb. 24,
2004), httpJ/chillingeffects.org/fainise/notice.cgi?NoticelD=1 132.
175. Bill Werde, Defiant Downloads Rise From Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004,
http:l/www.nytimes.com/2004/02/25/artslmusic/25REMI.html?ex=1232946000&en=1570b2c178bd
76e7&ei=5070.
176. The Grey Album Legal Battle Summarized, supra note 172.
177. Even the Lenz court doubted that the Section 512(f) claim would survive summary
judgment. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
178. Whether such persons are acting willfully blind will vary with the circumstances. Even
laypeople have been sufficiently exposed through the media to widely publicized disputes that they
may realize that certain conduct (for example, non-commercial parodies) are possibly not
infringing. Such circumstances might also give rise to inquiry into fair or non-infringing use before
a take-down is sent.
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content put back online without having to file a suit for a declaration of
non-infringement? Unfortunately, the bases for counter-notices are not
clear. I argue below that fair use is sufficient to justify a counter-notice.
In addition, this Part argues that any fears over frivolous counter-notices
are likely overstated due to the fact that users sending counter-notices
may subject themselves to liability for copyright and Section 512(f)
liability. Finally, this Part considers the reality that DMCA notices are
unhelpful in resolving the considerations present in complex fair use
disputes.
A.

What's a "mistake"?

The right of counter-notification would appear at first glance to be a
powerful tool. But the scope of counter-notification at first seems to be
narrow. Whereas a take-down can claim material to be "infringing,"
nowhere does Section 512(g) state that a counter-notificationcan claim
material is "non-infringing," such as under fair use.179 Instead, a
counter-notification must include "[a] statement under penalty of perjury
that the subscriber has a good faith belief that the material was removed
or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of the material to
be removed or disabled.' 80 Reading Section 512(g) in isolation, it is not
at all clear that "mistake" can include a "mistaken view of the law," such
as a notification that fails to consider an assertion of fair or other noninfringing use.18 1 At the very least, "mistake or misidentification" would
seem to concern materials removed by error (such as an intermediary
mistakenly removing the wrong webpage), or identified in error (such as
the owner misidentifying the URL of the page to be removed). But does
"mistake" also include fair or other non-infringing use? It could easily

179. Compare 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3XAXiii), (c)(3)(AXv) (West 2009) (elements of
notification), with id. § 512(gX3XC) (elements of counter-notification).
180. Id. § 512(gX3)(C); see also supra Part I.C (discussing problems with statute).
181. It appears that no court has considered whether "mistake" encompasses fair or other noninfringing uses. Commentators have taken a variety of approaches. See JAY DRATLER, JR.,
CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM § 6.03 n. 464 (2008) (stating
that the statute "does not permit counter-notifications based on disputes, whether or not in good
faith, over ownership of copyright or copyright infringement (for example, based on a belief that an
exception such as fair use applies)"); Kasunic, supra note 25, at 415 n. 59 ("It is not at all clear...
that a subscriber whose use was noninfringing .. . [can assert] 'mistake or misidentification."');
Scott, supra note 75, at 132 & n.188 (citing DRATLER, supra note 181, and stating "it is by no
means clear that 'mistake or misidentification' covers situations where the complainant was simply
wrong about the claim of infringement"); Williams, supra note 99, at 2-3 n.7 (noting Ashcroft's
statement and suggesting courts would be likely to treat "mistake or misidentification" as permitting
claims of non-infringing use).
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be argued that it does not. Congress could have written Section 512(g)
to permit counter-notices based on "a good faith belief that the material
was fair use or otherwise not infringing."' 182 But Congress did not do
that.
Such a reading is extremely troubling because it would prevent
non-judicial replacement of materials removed by a baseless take-down
notice. Even worse, a user sending a counter-notice opens itself up to
charges of perjury. Although an owner need not claim infringement
under penalty of perJury, 183 a user's assertion of "mistake or
misidentification" must be made under penalty of perjury. 184 For users
who have a viable fair use defense, the prospect of jail is chilling. It is
no surprise, then, 8 that
counter-notifications are sent out far less often
5
notifications.
than
Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether this flawed statute
can be read to permit fair use as a basis for counter-notification. For a
number of reasons, I think it should. As noted previously, during the
drafting of the DMCA, Senator Ashcroft found it "totally unacceptable"
86
that a "user would have to go to court to prove their innocence."'
Having prompted the amendment that led to the counter-notice
procedure, Ashcroft expressly stated that a failure to consider fair use
was a mistake, and that the counter-notices permitted users to "put their
material 7 back on-line, without the need to hire a lawyer and go to
18

Court.'

182. Indeed, the misrepresentation provision distinguishes between an owner's
misrepresentation "that material or activity is infringing," and a user's misrepresentation "that
material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification." 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(f)
(West 2009).
183. Regarding sworn statements, the only thing the copyright owner (or its agent) must state
under penalty of perjury is "that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of
an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed." Id. § 512(c)(3)(AXvi). The other elements of the
notification can be asserted without having to expressly submit oneself to perjury, including the
assertions that the use is infringing, that it is unauthorized, and that the information in the
notification is accurate. Id.§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), (v), (vi).
184. A counter-notification must include "A statement under penalty of perjury that the
subscriber has a good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or
misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled." Id.§ 512(g)(3)(C) (emphasis added).
185. As noted by Robert Kasunic, "[t]he paucity of§ 512(g) counter-notifications may, in part,
be the result of the fact that the counter-notification requirements do not expressly address
noninfringing use or fair use as a basis for replacing content." Kasunic, supra note 25, at 415; see
also Quilter Comments, supra note 12, at 1030 ("The counter-notice process is virtually never used,
for various reasons.").
186. 144 CONG. REc. S4884-01, S4889 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); see also
supra Part I.C.
187. 144 CONG. REc. S4884-01, S4889 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); see also
supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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Although legislative history is not determinative when a statute is
clear on its face, Section 512(g) is arguably ambiguous, permitting
exploration of legislative history.1 88 The term "mistake" might refer to a
mistake of fact or a mistake of law.' 89 Plus, the structure of Section
512(g), looking to removal "as a result of mistake," does not make it
clear whose mistake would be relevant: the owner's, the intermediary's,
or both?' 90 Although the statement of a lone Senator might normally
merit little weight, Senator Ashcroft was instrumental in pushing for the
counter-notification procedure, so his views may merit some weight.' 9'
On the other hand, it would appear that fair use was primarily Senator
Ashcroft's cause. Although Senators Hatch and Leahy spoke about the
bill from the Senate floor, neither commented on the
meaning of
92
counter-notifications.
in
use
fair
of
role
the
or
"mistake"
188. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 n. 16 (2003) (ambiguity permits
consideration of legislative history).
189. Courts have differed over the meaning of "mistake" in the context of relation-back. In
civil litigation, if a pleading is amended to change a party or its name, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permit relation-back to the date of the original pleading if certain conditions are met,
including that the party being brought in must have "[known] or should have known that the action
would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity." FED.
R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Some courts hold lack of knowledge is a "mistake," and others do not.
Compare Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the term
"mistake" in Rule permitting relation-back when party name changed, does not include "lack of
knowledge of the proper party") and Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466, 469-70 (2d
Cir. 1995) (collecting cases), with Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir.
1977) (permitting relation-back for amendment replacing "John Doe" with named party), and
Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 543, 547 (D. Nev. 1981) (holding that mistake "exists
whenever a party who may be liable... was omitted"); see also MARCUS, supra note 125, at 224-25
(excerpting Swartz case, discussing meaning of "mistake" in context of Rule 15(c)(1)(C), and citing
cases).

190. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(3)(C) (West 2009) ("A statement under penalty of pejury that
the subscriber has a good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of
mistake or misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled.").
191. Ashcroft has prior interests in copyright matters. When he was Missouri's Attorney
General, he filed a brief in the Sony Betamax case in support of consumers. See Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984); 144 CONG. REc. S4884-01,
S4890 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
192. See 144 CONG. REC. S4884-01, S4884-S4885 (May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
id. S4885-S4887 (statement of Sen. Leahy). Neither may guidance be found in the Senate Judiciary
Committee report, which mostly discusses the bill in general terms. See SEN. REP No. 105-190, at 7
(May 11, 1998) (noting the Ashcroft-Hatch-Leahy amendment); id. at 9 (noting protections for
subscribers so that they are not "mistakenly" denied web access); id. at 19-21 (discussing bill
generally); id. at 50-51 (discussing put-back procedure generally). The most relevant comment is
this:
The Committee was acutely concerned that it provide all end-users-whether contracting
with private or public sector online service providers-with appropriate procedural
protections to ensure that material is not disabled without proper justification. The
provisions in the bill balance the need for rapid response to potential infringement with
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But we need not rely solely on legislative history. 193 More helpful
is the overall structure of Section 512, which assumes that a "mistake"
refers to errors of fact and errors of law in a take-down notice. One
basis for counter-notification is that the materials were removed due to
"misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled." 194 This
language is an obvious reference to the elements of notification by the
owner, namely identification of the copyrighted work and of the
infringing materials.195 But if misidentification refers to the elements of
an owner's take-down, mistake should logically concern elements of the
owner's take-down as well. Most significantly here, the take-down must
include "[a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief
that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by
the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.' 196 Thus, by the structure of
the statute, a notification that erroneously asserts infringement contains a
mistake of law that can serve as a basis for counter-notification. Put
simply: 1) a take-down must assert that the use is unauthorized by the
law; 2) a mistake in a take-down is a mistake that supports a counter-

the end-users legitimate interests in not having material removed without recourse.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added). For his part, Sen. Leahy added a statement to the Committee Report
stating:
[A]n Ashcroft-Leahy-Hatch amendment was adopted to ensure that computer users are
given reasonable notice of when their Web sites are the subject of infringement
complaints, and to provide procedures for computer users to have material that is
mistakenly taken down put back online.
Id. at 67 (emphasis added). Similarly, little of interest can be found in the relevant House
Commerce and Conference reports. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(11), at 20-21, 33, 59-60 (1998)
(Commerce Committee report); H. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72-76 (1998), reprinted in 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. 649-52 (Conference report).
193. One court characterized a counter-notice as one "of noninfringement." Online Policy
Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2004). At least one ISP appears to
treat non-infringing use as sufficient for a counter-notice. Chilling Effects has a communication
appearing to be from an ISP to one of its users stating that a counter-notice can assert "that the
Claimant is wrong and that the Infringing Material is lawfully posted on the Web Site." Letter from
ThePlanet to user (Jan., 16, 2008), http://chillingeffects.org/copyright/notice.cgi?NoticelD=16926.
Likely others do as well. The Electronic Frontier Foundation - a free-speech advocacy group that
represented Lenz - takes the position that counter-notices can assert fair use. See Electronic
Property,
Intellectual
Guide:
Bloggers'
Legal
Foundation,
Frontier
http://www.eff.org/issues/bloggers/legalliability/IP (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) ("The DMCA
provides an opportunity for you to counter-notify, to tell your ISP that the material in question is not
infringing."). YouTube states that counter-notices can assert fair use. YouTube, YouTube
Procedure,
Counternotice
and
DMCA
Policy:
Copyright
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer-83757&topic=13656 (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009).
194. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(3)(C) (West 2009).
195. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii), (iii).
196. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (emphasis added).
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notice; 3) a fair use is a use that is authorized by the law; and 4) a takedown that erroneously claims that fairly used content is infringing is a
mistake for purposes of Section 512(g), thus supporting counter-notice.
The next section addresses protections against the danger of frivolous
counter-notices.
B.

Limiting abusive counter-notifications

One might object that permitting fair use as a basis for counternotice might lead to a deluge of frivolous put-back demands. Any such
objection is somewhat disingenuous, as it ignores that baseless takedown notices cause the removal of lawful speech that would never be
permitted in judicial proceedings. More fundamentally, how do we best
ensure that lawful speech is not removed and that infringing conduct is?
I think that fears of a floodgate of frivolous put-backs are likely
overblown. Let us not forget that we are talking about copyright
infringement. A user who posts infringing material that is removed, and
who later gets it put back based on a meritless counter-notice, is still an
infringer. Under normal copyright law, he or she might be liable for
197
actual or statutory damages, as well as attorney's fees.
Further, Section 512 contains a number of protections that limit
abuse. First, what goes for the goose goes for the gander. Under Lenz,
if an owner must consider fair use before sending a take-down, then a
user must consider whether the use is infringing before sending a
counter-notification. Second, to avoid foul play, the statute makes the
user's burden extra high: whereas an owner need not risk perjury when
making its substantive assertion of infringement, 198 the user must make
the substance of its counter-notification upon penalty of perjury.99 This
by itself is quite chilling for users. Third, when sending a counternotice, the user must provide their name, address, and telephone
number.200 This is a tremendous concession by users who lose any
197. See id. §§ 412, 501, 504, 505. Indeed, a user who knowingly sends a baseless counternotification may be a willful infringer, subjecting themselves to the higher statutory damages of
Section 504(c)(2).
198. The only thing the owner needs to state under penalty of peijury is "that the complaining
party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed,"
which is an easy requirement to satisfy. Id. § 512(cX3XA)(Xvi). In comparison, the more important
substantive statement of "good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is
not authorized" need not be made under penalty of perjury. Id. § 512(cX3XA)(v).
199. The counter-notice must include "[a] statement under penalty of perjury that the
subscriber has a good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or
misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled." Id. § 512(g)(3XC) (emphasis added).
200. Id. § 512(gX3)(D).
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anonymity, enabling service of process. More importantly, they must
consent to jurisdiction for the federal judicial district for the address.2 °'
Obtaining consent to jurisdiction is of tremendous benefit to owners,
who may otherwise struggle to determine where personal jurisdiction
whether it exists under the nebulous
would be appropriate 2and
02
"minimum contacts" test.
Finally and most importantly, there's justification to conclude that
the assertion of non-infringement-as-mistake must be more than nonfrivolous. By choosing the word "mistake," Congress intended counternotifications to be based on erroneous claims of infringement (either
factually or legally). Thus, to the extent that a counter-notification relies
on fair use, the user must be able to state in good faith that there is a
colorable mistake of law, not just that there is some slender thread of
hope for fair use.
What might this mean? Although the question is extremely
difficult, I would suggest consideration by analogy to the defense of
qualified immunity used in federal civil rights actions. Under qualified
immunity, a state actor is generally not liable for deprivations of civil
rights unless their conduct violated "clearly established" law of which a
reasonable person would have known.2 °3 Equally so, if a court finds that
a use is not fair, the user should not be found to have made a "knowing
material misrepresentation" in its counter-notice unless its use was
infringing under clearly established law that a reasonable person would
have known or would have learned through reasonable inquiry.
It might be argued by owners that the standard should be the
opposite, a mirror image of what I suggest above. Under a mirror image,
a counter-notification would be proper under Section 512(f) only if the
disputed use was fair or otherwise non-infringing under clearly
established law. I reject this reading because it leaves no breathing room
for the indeterminacy of the fair-use doctrine. More fundamentally, the
statute makes clear that a counter-notice need not be unassailable.

201. Id. If the user is located outside the United States, they must consent to jurisdiction in any
district where the intermediary may be found. Id.
202. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
203. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2009) (action for deprivation of civil rights); Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (holding that qualified immunity hinges "on whether the right
that was transgressed was clearly established - that is, whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted") (some internal quotations
removed); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known").

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

43

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 5
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[3:121

Instead, Section 512(g) only requires that a user have a goodfaith belief
that the take-down was based on a mistake. 20 4 This does not require that
the user be correct, it only requires that the user have a good faith belief
that the owner is wrong. This should permit an argument that current
law does not foreclose fair use and that a reasonable extension or
analogous application of existing law would support fair use.
But I emphasize that it is not enough for a user to blithely assert fair
use without inquiry. A take-down puts a user on notice of claimed
infringement. Before sending a counter-notice, the user must consider
whether its use is infringing.20 5 Just as an owner cannot be willfully
blind to fair use, a user cannot be willfully blind to its own
infringement.2 6 A user's willful failure to consider the merits of its
counter-notice could be a bad faith assertion of non-infringement, and
may open it up to Section 512(f) liability if the use was infringing under
clearly established law that a reasonable person would have known or
would have learned through reasonable inquiry.
Nevertheless, copyright owners may still fear that permitting
counter-notifications to assert fair use will encourage baseless counternotifications, increasing infringement and gutting the protections they
obtained through the DMCA. Indeed, it is true that my approach would
increase the number of counter-notifications and likely also lead to some
baseless fair use claims. However, I think this argument proves too
much, as can be shown by examination of the same hypotheticals
discussed in the context of take-down notices. 20 7 I will re-address the
same examples discussed in Part III.D, but in an order more fitting to the
counter-notice concerns at hand.
1. Likely non-infringement
Part III.D.2 discussed two examples: Hitler's globe, and an Air
Force video. Suppose hypothetically a user had taken a picture of
Hitler's globe and posted it to a website. Suppose additionally that the
purchaser of the globe, who apparently lacks copyright, has the photo
removed pursuant to a take-down notice. Under such circumstances, the
take-down would appear to be unfounded and the user must have the
right to assert the purchaser's mistaken claim of ownership as a basis for

204.
205.
use.
206.
207.

17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(3)(C) (West 2009).
The extent of the due diligence may vary depending on the circumstances of the disputed
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part llI.D.
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put-back. Requiring the user to file suit to obtain put-back would be a
heavy burden, considering that this hypothetical claim appears to be
without merit.
Similarly, recall the take-down of the Air Force video. The user
whose online content is removed may reasonably question whether the
Air Force had any rights to assert. Here, however, the user should not
blindly assume that the Air Force has no rights as they might exist via
assignment. The user might therefore make an inquiry with the Air
Force, asking whether it owns any copyright. If the work was entirely
created as a U.S. Government work, then no copyright rights ever
existed and the take-down notice would be baseless. On the other hand,
it is possible that the work did not qualify as a government work and that
any copyright was properly assigned to the Air Force. But by making
inquiry,8 a user avoids willful blindness, making a counter-notice in good
20
faith.
2. Likely fair use
Part III.D.3 discussed the examples of Wendy Seltzer's NFL video,
Senator McCain's dispute with Fox News, and the Lenz case. All three
cases involve strong assertions of fair use because the uses were either
non-commercial (Seltzer and Lenz), for purposes of commentary or
criticism (Seltzer and McCain), or were parodic in nature (Lenz). In all
three cases, only small amounts of the original works were used
(Seltzer's short clip, McCain's short clip, and Lenz's twenty-second
audio of poor quality). In two of them, the original materials taken were
factual or not particularly creative in nature (Seltzer's NFL video and
McCain's portion of a debate). In all, the prospects of market harm were
little-to-none. Nobody will stop watching NFL games because of
Seltzer's video. Nobody will stop watching Fox News because Senator
McCain used a portion of his own debate performance in a campaign
advertisement. Nobody will substitute Lenz's low-resolution audio of
twenty seconds of Let's Go Crazy for Prince's original. All three cases
show strong fair use arguments. Under such circumstances, users would
have strong bases for asserting put-back, making their counter-notices in
good faith.

208. Even if the Air Force owns the video, the use might be fair if done for purposes of
commentary, which should be considered by the user. This would require further analysis.
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3. Unclear fair use
Part III.D.4 gave an example of unclear fair use, namely, Danger
Mouse's The Grey Album. There are meritorious fair use arguments
here. The work was not distributed commercially. Although it's hard to
characterize The Grey Album as a typical parody (it doesn't make you
laugh),2 °9 the work is nonetheless highly transformative, by taking two
seemingly disparate styles of music and mashing them together into
something new. By doing so, Danger Mouse comments, in a fashion, on
both works. But there are counter-arguments. Both the original works
(The White Album and The Black Album) are commercial creative works.
Plus, one can argue that The Grey Album might serve as a market
substitute, at least for users who want to hear The Black Album. 210 One
could even argue that mash-ups might be something that the owners 21
of
the original works might be interested in creating or licensing.
Indeed, The Beatles themselves have recently released a mash-up album
of their own works, Love, which takes snippets from various Beatles'
songs and works them together in new ways.212
Such a case shows a good example of where both the take-down
and the counter-notice might be made in good faith. The law on fair use
here is sufficiently uncertain that the copyright owner could conclude in
good faith that the use is not fair, permitting take-down. Equally so, the
user could conclude in good faith that fair use is not at all foreclosed
under existing law, also permitting a counter-notice. Recalling my
qualified-immunity analogy, here, the user would not be making a
knowing material misrepresentation, because the disputed use was not
considered infringing by clearly established law. Instead, it is an unclear
issue that requires court adjudication. After counter-notice, the materials
should be restored. If the owner cares enough, it should negotiate with
the user or file suit. The lack of a real copyright injury here is implicitly
209. Nonetheless, in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the court held that the book Wind
Done Gone was a parody of Mitchell's Gone with the Wind, although the parodic nature of the book
was somewhat hard to discern. 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 & n. 23 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (taking an approach
to parody that "requires no assessment of whether or not a work is humorous").
210. Market substitution would be less clear for The White Album because only snippets of
some of the songs are taken. But entire Jay-Z songs with the full lyrics are used in The Grey Album.
211. Compare Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387
(6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting argument that licensing argument is circular), and American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994) (same), with Williams and Wilkins v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 n. 19 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("one cannot assume at the start the merit of
the plaintiffs position, i. e., that plaintiff had the right to license"), affldby equally div. ct., 420 U.S.
376 (1975).
212. TuE BEATLES, LOVE (EMI Records LtdJApple Corps. Ltd. 2006).
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underscored by the fact that The Grey Album remains online years after
Grey Tuesday.
4. Likely infringement
Finally, I will discuss cases where infringement is likely. Part
III.D. 1 discussed the examples of the album Chinese Democracy and the
movie Shrek the Third. As noted, such cases present what appear to be
obvious cases of copyright infringement. Under such circumstances,
there would appear to be no mistake of law and a user would have no
basis to send a counter-notice. Significantly, a take-down notice
provides circumstances that would require the user to consider whether
the disputed use is in fact infringing. Failure to do before sending
counter-notice could be willful blindness. 21 3 As a practical matter, users
who engage in flagrant infringement are unlikely to send counternotices, because they would have to sacrifice anonymity and consent to
suit for significant damages. This factor by itself will significantly deter
baseless counter-notices.
C.

The DMCA is poorly suitedfor complex cases

As a final note, the fact that some people may abuse the process is
not a proper basis to deny users the right to make good faith assertions of
fair use. Indeed, considering that fair use is an often indeterminate area
of the law, the DMCA take-down procedure is ill-suited to bona fide
issues of fair use. A useful analogy can be found through domain name
disputes. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
("UDRP") is a streamlined arbitration procedure that was created to
provide a low-cost and quick mechanism to obtain transfer of
cybersquatted domain names. 214 It is more involved than DMCA takedowns but is significantly quicker and cheaper than court litigation.
However, some disputes are still better suited to full judicial
intervention. One UDRP panel, over dissent, refused to transfer the
domain name MERCEDESSHOP.COM to DaimlerChrysler.2 5 The

213. Indeed, in a world where RIAA lawsuits and knowledge of the Napster lawsuit is
widespread, people commonly know that file sharers may be directly liable for copyright
infringement.
214. ICANN,
Uniform
Domain
Name
Dispute
Resolution
Policy,
http://www.icann.orglen/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (adopted Aug. 26, 1999).
215. DaimlerChrysler A.G. v. Donald Drummonds, WIPO No. D2001-0160 (2001), available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/htmii/200l/d2001)-160.html.
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case raised difficult issues of trademark fair use, and the majority
concluded such matters were far beyond the limited scope of the UDRP:
The majority also notes that the Policy was not designed to
deal with, nor is the Panel asked to determine, the issue of
trademark infringement. Whether the use of Complainant's
trademark on Respondent's web site constitutes trademark
infringement is not for the Panel to decide. If Complainant
216
wishes to pursue that issue, other forums are available.
These considerations ring even clearer in the context of a Section
512 take-down. In a case where infringement is obvious, it will provide
a quick remedy to the owner. But where potentially difficult issues of
fair use exist, Section 512's simple ex parte procedure is less
appropriate, and breathing room must be given for users to obtain putback. If owners care enough about the dispute, the burden should be on
them to choose court litigation, where fair use can be adjudicated by a
knowledgeable and neutral judge. Indeed, Section 512 itself makes clear
that in normal circumstances, it is not the user who is expected to file
suit, but the owner. Whereas a user sending counter-notice must submit
to personal jurisdiction, there is no comparable provision for an owner
sending a take-down notice. 21 7 Also, the counter-notice provision
indicates that put-back must occur between ten and fourteen days after
counter-notice is received, unless the service provider receives notice
that the owner has filed a relevant copyright lawsuit.21 8 Thus, the burden
of filing suit is on the owner and not the user.219 Although the DMCA is
intended to reduce transaction costs through an abbreviated procedure,
more complex disputes belong in a court of law, and the burden of
seeking judicial redress should be placed on the party who seeks
removal of the speech of others.22 °
As a practical matter, after a counter-notice is sent, the owner
should contact the user directly. If the material is indeed infringing, a
proper cease-and-desist letter sent directly to the user can directly inform

216. Id. at 6.
217. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(3)(D) (West 2009).
218. Id. § 512(gX2)(C).
219. Nonetheless, there is no bar on users filing suits for a declaration of non-infringement.
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 2009) (declaratory judgment act). Plus, Section 512(f) permits users
to seek damages and attorney's fees for an owner's knowing material misrepresentations that the
materials were infiinging. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(f) (West 2009).
220. Indeed, considering how willing the RIAA was to file numerous lawsuits for file-sharing,

it is hard to imagine that it would be that burdensome for copyright owners to file copyright suits if
they are particularly interested in pressing their claims.
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him or her of the consequences, and may achieve the owner's goals
directly without the need for more formal legal action. After all, when a
user sends a counter-notification, it is incumbent on the owner to reconsider its claim: the user has claimed on penalty of perjury that the
owner made a mistake of law or fact in its notice. At this point, the
appropriate course of action is for the parties to resolve the matter or
litigate.
Moreover, experience has shown that it is indeed possible for
copyright owners to tell the difference between clear cases of
infringement and more difficult cases. Viacom - the company that has
sued YouTube for copyright infringement - now uses real people trained
in fair use to review videos. 22' It further declares that it has "not
generally challenged users... where the use or copy is occasional and is
a creative, newsworthy or transformative use of a limited excerpt for non
commercial purposes. ,,222 It would appear that Viacom is more
interested in removal of clearly infringing materials and has little-to-no
interest in expending resources on bonafide fair-use issues. Even more
fundamentally, Viacom likely has little interest in antagonizing viewers
who watch its shows and movies. Such an approach gives some reason
for cautious optimism regarding the future of fair use on the internet. 23

221. See supra note 34 (regarding suit by Viacom against YouTube); K.C. Jones, Viacom
Settles One
YouTube
Copyright Dispute, INFORMATIONWEEK,
Apr. 4,
2007,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/ebusiness/showArticle.jhtmlarticlelD= 199201099.
Viacom was sued for taking down a YouTube video with material from Comedy Central. See
Williams, supra note 99, at 4-6 (discussing suit over Stop the Falsiness video). Viacom admitted
that the take-down was erroneous and improved its existing copyright procedures (which it claimed
were already good), including posting materials online regarding fair use. See Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Viacom Admits Error - Takes Steps to Protect Fair Use on YouTube, Apr. 23, 2007,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/04/viacom-admits-error-takes-steps-protect-fair-use-youtube.
The suit was dismissed by the plaintiffs. Id.
222. Viacom, Fair Use and Availability of Viacom Content on Authorized Websites,
http://www.viacom.com/news/pages/aboutfairuse.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). A presentation
by Viacom general counsel Michael Fricklas is illuminating. See Hoag Levins, producer, Why
Viacom Ignores Mash-ups of Its Copyrighted Content, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://adage.com/video/article?articleid=134571 (including link to podcast). Fricklas considers fair
use to be a "sideshow," and that the real issue is "exact copies with no substantial additional
creativity." Id.He also noted that he would not be interested in taking down a video of SpongeBob
Squarepants to which somebody had added a soundtrack, regardless of whether the use was fair. Id.
223. An interesting development beyond the scope of this Article is the role of automatic
filtering systems. YouTube's "Content ID" tool permits owners to create digital "fingerprints" of
their audio and video works; if a user's video matches the fingerprint, the video it can be blocked,
tracked, or monetized.
YouTube, YouTube Copyright Policy: Video Identification Tool,
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=83766 (last visited Feb. 17,
2009); YouTube, Content Identification and Management System (Content ID),
http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). Although the system is efficient
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CONCLUSION

Although I have titled this Article Safety Dance, it might have
easily been called DMCA Take-Downs and Fair Use: A Tale of Two
Senators. Despite Senator Ashcroft's desire, the take-down procedure
has not protected users as much as he hoped. But with a more fair-use
friendly interpretation, many of Ashcroft's goals might be realized. In
contrast, under current law, no amount of interpretation can support the
suggestions made by Senator McCain. Intermediaries have done much
to further the goals of fair use, but they cannot be expected to cavalierly
sacrifice their safe harbor. In sum, other courts should adopt the holding
of Lenz, making copyright owners stop-and-think before sending
baseless take-down notices. Owners cannot be willfully blind to strong
showings of fair use. Finally, users must be permitted to send counternotifications based on fair or other non-infringing use.

for owners, it can lead to erroneous removals of arguable fair uses, such as when a user creates a
remix video using copyrighted music along with images that comment on the music. See Fred von
Lohmann, YouTube's January Fair Use Massacre, EFF DEEPLINKS BLOG, Feb. 3, 2009,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/01/youtubes-january-fair-use-massacre; cf also supra notes 9192 and accompanying text (discussing Shatner video). YouTube does have procedures to protect
users. YouTube permits users to dispute removals, and upon receiving a dispute, it notifies the
copyright owner, who must decide whether to submit a take-down notice. See YouTube, Copyright
ID
Disputes,
Disputes:
Video
Claim
http://www.google.com/support/youtubefbin/answer.pyanswer=83768 (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
The Content ID program is outside of the scope of the DMCA, but properly implemented, could go
a long way towards permitting efficient copyright enforcement without overly censoring fair use.
First, filtering technology should be further refined to err on the side of transformative uses. Von
Lohmann suggests that videos not be removed unless both audio and video coincide. See Von
Lohmann, supra. Instead, where the match is only audio or video, a better course for YouTube
would be to notify the owner rather than automatically blocking the user's video. Indeed, if Viacom
doesn't care if somebody puts a soundtrack to SpongeBob, why should YouTube? See Levins,
supra note 222 (comments by Viacom general counsel Michael Fricklas). Second, users must be
able to assert fair or other non-infringing uses as a basis for put-back of blocked materials. Third,
put-back should be immediate or relatively quick, since the ten to fourteen day delay of the DMCA
is inapplicable.
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